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INTRODUCTION
E VERY lawyer needs a choice of law theory. A choice of law is
the starting point in any legal analysis, for it is impossible to
apply a rule to a set of facts until one knows what rule to apply in
the first place. Simply put, choice of law principles are the law of
. J.D. expected May 2009, University of Virginia School of Law. I would to thank all
of my professors at the University of Virginia, especially Professors Michael Collins
and Barry Cushman, two of the most gifted and generous teachers I have known. I
would also like to thank Daniel Bress, Craig Chosiad and Adam Sofen for their help-
ful editorial suggestions. Finally, my deepest thanks go to Hilary P. Stern, without
whose patience, intelligence, and support this project could not have been completed
and to whom it is dedicated. All errors are my own.
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laws.' How surprising it is then that a state's decision to decide an
issue under its own law and not another's is today practically im-
mune from constitutional scrutiny.' After all, the Constitution is it-
self a set of laws about laws;3 it might be expected to have some-
thing to say about choice of law. Yet even in a time of renewed
interest in notions of state sovereignty, the jurisdictional dimension
of "horizontal federalism" has not attracted attention from the Su-
preme Court
This was not always the case. A century ago, the Supreme Court
actively policed interstate boundaries of legislative jurisdiction, in-
validating what it considered extraterritorial applications of state
law.6 Aggressive federal review of state choice of law coincided
with the period associated with Lochner v. New York,7 among the
'This Note uses the terms "choice of law," "conflict of laws," and "legislative juris-
diction" largely interchangeably.
2 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981); see also Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Founda-
tions of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 257-58 (1992); Gene R. Shreve,
Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 Ind. L.J. 271, 271 (1996); Louise
Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 440-41
(1982).
'See John Harrison, The Free Exercise Clause as a Clause About Rules, 15 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 169, 174 (1992).
'Choice of law certainly has the potential to implicate the most controversial issues
in American constitutional law, including same-sex marriage, abortion rights, and gun
control. See Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 Fla. L. Rev.
799, 802 (1999); Seth F. Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom ... ": The Right
to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 907, 910-12 (1993); Allen
Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided Revival of Strict
Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 115, 115-16; see
also Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity 3-4
(1981) (describing the role of conflicts of law with respect to slavery in prccipitating
national crisis in antebellum America).
'See Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal
Federalism, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 289, 290 (2003); cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989).
6See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Deci-
sions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1926); Oliver P. Field, Ju-
dicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 12 Minn. L. Rev.
439, 440-41 (1928); Stephen I. Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for
Public Acts, 24 I11. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1929); G.W.C. Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws
Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 161, 180 (1931); Com-
ment, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes, 45 Yale L.J. 339, 339-40 (1935).
'198 U.S. 45 (1905).
1510
Choice of Law
most vilified Supreme Court decisions in American history, and
the Court's choice of law opinions have been tainted by the
broader criticisms of the Lochner Era Court. Professor Robert
Sedler, for example, has argued that, in the field of choice of law,
the Lochner Court dedicated itself to "protecting business enter-
prises from what it considered improper interferences with free-
dom of contract" just as it did in its substantive due process deci-
sions.9
Certainly, there is a connection. Allgeyer v. Louisiana,' ° authored
by the same Justice who wrote Lochner and often considered the
first case to use substantive due process to overturn a state law,"
struck down a Louisiana statute because it interfered with the "lib-
erty to contract" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In All-
geyer, however, the Court did not create an absolute right to eco-
nomic liberty. The defendant in the case was prosecuted for buying
insurance from an out-of-state insurance company. The Court em-
phasized that Louisiana could have restricted or even outlawed the
transaction if it had taken place in the state, but since the contract
had been made in New York, only New York had the power to
regulate it. In short, it was the state's extraterritorial regulation
that offended the Due Process Clause. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the
'See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 293, 295
(1985); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373, 373
(2003) ("Would you ever cite this case in a Supreme Court brief, except to identify it
with your opponents' position?").
'Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective
of Constitutional Generalism, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 59, 67 (1981). Other scholars have
implied that the sins of Lochner were present in the Supreme Court choice of law
doctrine. E.g., Donald Berman, To Brainerd Currie: A Fallen Giant, 46 Ohio St. L.J.
529, 532 (1985); Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and
Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1226 (1992); Stephen Gard-
baum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 483,565-66 (1997).
10165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
"See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 613-14
(3d ed. 2006); 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1344 (3d ed. 2000);
Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 Cardozo L. Rev.
1689, 1701 (2005); David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and
the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 Geo. L.J. 1, 10 (2003).
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fountainhead of the infamous liberty of contract doctrine, was in
fact a choice of law case.1
2
By no means was this an isolated link between "substantive" due
process and choice of law principles. In fact, of the eighteen
Lochner Era opinions that used liberty of contract reasoning to
sustain constitutional challenges to state and federal laws, 3 eight
involved instances of a state supposedly exceeding its territorial ju-
risdiction. 4 Whether the connection is the one Professor Sedler
suggests is another matter, however. In the years since he wrote,
scholarly understanding of the Lochner Court has undergone a
mini-revolution, 5 while at the same time there has been persistent
dissatisfaction with contemporary choice of law theory. 6
This Note will reconsider the Court's choice of law decisions in
light of these developments and suggest that the choice of law deci-
sions have more to teach about Lochner than Lochner has to teach
about choice of law. It will demonstrate that while the Court's
choice of law decisions cannot simply be dismissed as "Lochner-
12 See Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896-Embracing Due Process, 45 Am. J.
Legal Hist. 71, 85-87 (2001); Nathan Greene, The Allgeyer Case as a Constitutional
Embrasure of Territoriality, 2 St. John's L. Rev. 22 (1927).
13 This figure is derived from Michael J. Phillips, The Lochner Court, Myth and Re-
ality: Substantive Due Process from the 1890s to the 1930s, 86 n.210 (2001). Professor
Phillips lists fifteen cases, of which eleven expressly turn on liberty of contract doc-
trines and four use one of those eleven as a rule of decision. To Phillips's list, I have
added three additional cases, all of which concern choice of law: New York Life In-
surance Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit the
statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State and in the State of
New York and there destroy freedom of contract without throwing down the constitu-
tional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful
authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution
depends."), Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143, 149-50 (1934) (following Head), and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266
U.S. 389, 390 (1924) (same). An argument could also be made for the inclusion of
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930). Phillips does discuss these
cases in Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due
Process Effective?, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1049, 1064 n.63, 1076 n.124 (1997).
14 In addition to the cases listed supra note 13, these are Compania General de Ta-
bacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1927), St Louis
Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 348-49 (1922), New York Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-77 (1918), and Allgeyer, 165 U.S. 578. See Phil-
lips, supra note 13, at 86 n.210.
15 For an overview, see generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 Law
& Hist. Rev. 631 (2002).
16 See infra note 93.
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ing," they illustrate certain philosophical preconceptions that help
explain the rise and fall of the Lochner Era. Part I will provide a
comprehensive account of how the Court's choice of law doctrines
operated as a matter of constitutional law. Part II will show that
traditional criticisms of Lochner are largely inapplicable to the
Court's choice of law cases. Finally, Part III will help resolve lin-
gering questions in Lochner scholarship by showing how the con-
ceptions of legislative and judicial power suggested by the choice of
law cases-and the later abandonment of those conceptions-shed
light on Lochner Era fundamental rights.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE OF LAW RULES
Constitutional doctrines concerning interstate choice of law de-
veloped slowly across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The
most obvious treatment of the issue in the constitutional text is
contained in Article IV, which requires states to give "full faith and
credit" to the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State." 7 Conflicts of law were relatively rare in ante-
bellum America, 8 and it was not until 1887 that the Supreme Court
explicitly stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied to
the legislative acts of sister states, and not simply to the judgments
of their courts. 9 Having taken that step, however, the Court was
faced with a set of questions far more complicated than those it
confronted in forcing states to honor the judgments of one an-
7 The most significant choice of law issue addressed by the Constitution is the rela-
tionship between federal and state law, dealt with in the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI. Rather than conceive of state law as presumptively applicable but subject to pre-
emption, nineteenth-century constitutional theory understood the Supremacy Clause
as establishing a strict division of labor between the state and federal governments, an
arrangement termed "Dual Sovereignty." This was framed in territorialist terms. See,
e.g., Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 (1859) (stating that the boundary between
federal and state power was "as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and
monuments visible to the eye").
" See Edwin S. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 371,
385 (1933); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspec-
tive: Should the Restatement be "Continued"?, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 133, 135 (1954).
'9 Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887) (announcing
in dicta that "[w]ithout doubt, the constitutional requirement" of full faith and credit
"implies that the public acts of every state shall be given the same effect by the courts
of another state that they have by law and usage at home"); see also Comment, supra
note 6, at 341.
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other's courts. The Full Faith and Credit Clause might require a
state to use another state's law in some situations, but the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, also in Article IV, in some situations
required just the opposite. A state needed to know when it was re-
quired, when it was permitted, and when it was forbidden to apply
its own laws, and it needed to know whose laws it was to use when
it was disabled from using its own.' The Constitution's text raised
more questions than it answered when it came to choice of law.
A. The Territorialist Premise in Public Law
The basic solution to the Full Faith and Credit puzzle was sup-
plied by familiar notions of territorial sovereignty. Reigning choice
of law theories already made heavy use of territorialism. As a mat-
ter of English practice, territorialism had deep roots, both because
of the requirement at early common law that juries be selected
from the local population" and because of the obvious relevance of
territorial limitations for an island nation. In continental Europe,
positivist conceptions of law-according to which law was the ex-
pression of sovereign will rather than divine commandment or
natural order-had developed in conjunction with the rise of
walled city-states during the Renaissance,' and this helped bring
about territorial approaches to resolving conflicts of authority.'
Continental theorists, especially Dutch writer Ulrich Huber, pos-
ited that sovereign power was absolute within its territorial con-
fines, but ended at its borders.24 In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, English courts began to combine continental theory with
20 As Professor Laycock has put it, "[tlo simultaneously apply the conflicting law of
two states is impossible; to require each state to apply the law of the other is absurd;
and to let each state apply its own law repeals the Clause." Laycock, supra note 2, at
297.
21 Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdic-
tion and Choice of Law, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 249, 261 n.49 (1991).
22 E.g., Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1513).
See generally Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 1 (2006); Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International
Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297 (1953).
4 See De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis [The Conflict of Differ-
ing Laws of Different Governments] (1707), translated in Ernest G. Lorenzen,
Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 Ill. L. Rev. 375,403 (1919).
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English practice,25 and in 1834, territorialist principles were authori-
tatively distilled in U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story's
seminal Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. Justice Story's
Commentaries took a strictly territorial view of sovereign power,
but also postulated, as Huber had, that one sovereign might apply
the laws of another in order to promote "comity.,
26
The version of territorialism Justice Story espoused was applied
to relations between American states, not just to relations between
independent nations,27 and both before and after the Civil War, the
Supreme Court restricted state power on a territorial basis in nu-
merous respects.' The authority of states to adjudicate legal ques-
tions-their "judicial jurisdiction"-had long been limited by terri-
torial principles. A judgment of personal liability was not entitled
to full faith and credit if it was entered against a defendant absent
from the state rendering the judgment.29 In such a case, the judg-
ment-rendering state's action was an "illegitimate assumption of
power," and was to be "resisted as mere abuse., 31 In 1877, the
Court went even further, establishing in its landmark decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff that enforcement of such a judgment would vio-
late the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The
Court reasoned from Huber's and Story's territorialist maxims to
2 See D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on Eng-
lish Private International Law, 18 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 49, 65 (1937).
26 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hun-
dred Years After, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 15, 18-19 (1934).
27Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 609 (Boston, Little Brown,
8th ed. 1883).
" In addition to the doctrines listed, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court ini-
tially ruled that state sovereign immunity-in many respects the inverse corollary of
the theory of law as sovereign will-did not extend to suits brought in the federal
court system. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793), superseded by
amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XI. Similarly, a state could not be sued in another
state because no other state would be able to serve a state with process. See Caleb
Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv. L. Rev.
1559, 1613-1614 (2002).
29D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850); see also Hampton v.
M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818); Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason 35, 54-55
(C.C. Mass. 1828) (Story, J.).
D'Arcy, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 174.
95 U.S. 714, 715 n.8 (1877).
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establish the constitutional metes and bounds of state judicial
power over persons and property.32
The Court imposed territorial limits not only on the operation of
state courts but on the reach of state laws. Every significant attrib-
ute of legislative power available to states was territorially circum-
scribed. First, and most fundamentally, a state's "police powers"
were said to end at its borders.33 States could not criminalize activi-
ties in other states." Nor could one state expect another to enforce
its "penal" laws, a principle that not only limited the reach of state
criminal laws but which in some cases denied civil plaintiffs the
ability to recover super-compensatory damages. 5 Second, state tax-
32 Id. at 722 (stating that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover-
eignty over persons and property within its territory" but that "no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory"). No-
tably for our purposes, the Lochner Era Court later determined that an individual
debt obligation followed the debtor wherever he went, and thus the courts of any
state where a debtor was present could assert jurisdiction over the debt as if it were
tangible property. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 218 (1905).
33 The same was essentially true of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States
government. The Court was willing to permit federal law to reach activities overseas
only where the victim of the crime was the U.S. government, that is, the sovereign it-
self, United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922), or "in regions subject to no
sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as
adequate." Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909)
(Holmes, J.).
' Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 428 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[It is] clear, that a State legislature, the State of
Maryland for example,.cannot punish those who, in another State, conceal a felony
committed in Maryland."); cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). For competing
views on the force of these precedents, compare Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand:
The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 973, 974-75
(2002), with Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in Ameri-
can Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 855 (2002). See also Story, supra note 27, § 620,
("The common law considers crimes as altogether local, and cognizable and punish-
able exclusively in the country where they are committed."); cf. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816) (Story, J.) ("No part of the criminal juris-
diction of the United States can, consistently with the constitution, be delegated to
state tribunals.").
"5 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 293-94 (1888); see also The Antelope,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The Courts of no country exe-
cute the penal laws of another."); cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). In-
deed, the enactment by states of statutory wrongful death provisions in the years after
the Civil War was a leading source of interstate choice of law questions. See Corwin,
supra note 18, at 385. It should be noted that in cases like Pelican, the Court affirmed
the right of forum states not to enforce "penal" laws. Although the Court never faced
a case in which a state's decision to enforce such a law was challenged, territorial limi-
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ing power was territorially bounded. 6 On numerous occasions, the
nineteenth-century Supreme Court invalidated attempts by states
to tax property said to be located in other states, but the Court had
difficulty locating the constitutional source of the limitation. 7
Eventually, however, the Court settled on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, striking down allegedly extraterri-
torial taxes some twenty times between 1903 and 1933.38 The Court
also held that a state's power to exempt property from taxation-
even property the state had called into being-did not extend into
other states.3 9
Finally, territorialism was a bedrock principle of a significant
portion of the regulation of American businesses. Nineteenth-
century American law understood corporations as artificial "crea-
tations on the reach of penal laws were generally "taken for granted, as a principle
fundamental and beyond question." Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Pe-
nal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1932).
36 As early as McCulloch v. Maryland, in which the state of Maryland essentially
sought to tax the operations of the federally chartered Bank of the United States,
Chief Justice John Marshall allowed that while a state may tax "every object brought
within its jurisdiction," the tax imposed by Maryland went beyond that by levying a
tax upon an entity created by citizens of other states as well as by its own. 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall essentially justified the principle of
federal supremacy on the basis of the limits of interstate jurisdiction to tax.
31 See Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872) (dormant commerce clause);
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872) (Contracts Impair-
ment Clause); St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870) (no constitu-
tional provision cited); Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868) (same); Hays
v. Pac. Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854) (same); see also Maurice H.
Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word, 44 Yale L.J. 582 (1935).
3 Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Caro-
lina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Beidler v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1
(1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Min-
nesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929);
Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1
(1928); Southern Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76 (1927); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926); R.I. Hosp. Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69
(1926); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Provident Sav. Life Assurance
Soc'y v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915); Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912); Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907); Union Refrigera-
tor Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905); Del., Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Louisville &
Jefferson Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
" Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1881); see also Joseph Henry Beale, Cases
on Taxation 100-01 (1928).
Virginia Law Review
tures of statute" and saw states' authority to govern the legal pow-
ers of individual corporations as the appropriate mechanism to ad-
vance many of the regulatory concerns reflected today in complex
commercial statutes. Territorialism was essential to this arrange-
ment: because corporations were legislative creations, a corpora-
tion had no existence outside its state of incorporation unless other
states chose to recognize it (as an act of comity). ' Under this
scheme, the incorporating state could impose precise restrictions in
the corporation's charter, and any other state in which a corpora-
tion sought to do business could impose restrictions on the corpo-
ration in exchange for being allowed entry.4 A corporation that
was neither incorporated nor "doing business" within a given state,
however, could not be regulated by it, and a state admitting a for-
eign corporation could not include restrictions on corporate activi-
ties in other states as the price of admission.42 In short, territorial
boundaries performed a crucial function in the regulation of large-
scale business activity in pre-New Deal America.
Territorialism might have been an even larger part of the consti-
tutional landscape were it not for an important doctrine that made
it unnecessary to consider the issue in a significant number of
cases. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the so-called "dormant" commerce clause was seen as giving exclu-
sive legislative jurisdiction to the federal government in the regula-
tion of commercial activities that related to multiple states. The
doctrine broadly restricted the extraterritorial reach of state laws,
but there were a few important economic activities that fell outside
its domain. Notably, the Supreme Court concluded that the busi-
ness of insurance was not "commerce" for constitutional purposes,
and states could therefore regulate interstate insurance contracts
4 See Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Moderniza-
tion of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903,53 Bus. Hist. Rev. 304, 307 (1979); see
also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 520 (1839); Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of Foreign Cor-
porations in American Constitutional Law: A Contribution to the History and Theory
of Juristic Persons in Anglo-American Law 102 (1918).
" See Nat'l Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635, 645 (1904) (permit-
ting suit against a foreign corporation under local usury laws).
4 Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 435 (1926) (Holmes, J.) ("[A] corpora-
tion cannot be prevented from employing and paying those whom it needs for its
business outside the State" as a condition of doing business in a given state.).
1518 [Vol. 94:1509
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without any of the usual dormant commerce clause restrictions. 3
The abundance of insurance cases among the Supreme Court's
choice of law decisions suggests that use of the dormant commerce
clause concealed what would likely have been an even larger con-
cern for territorial limits on state power in the absence of the doc-
trine.
Viewed against this backdrop, neither the outcome in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana nor its reliance on notions of due process was especially
remarkable.44 Underscoring this point is the fact that Allgeyer was
bookended by two decisions in which state restrictions on purchas-
ing insurance from a foreign corporation were upheld-the differ-
ence being that in those cases, the corporations were said to have
agents operating within the regulating state.4'5 Furthermore, All-
geyer did not prove controversial. Decades later, Justice Holmes
relied upon the case in an opinion striking down a state tax on in-
surance policies made with unlicensed foreign corporations. ' Terri-
torial limits on state power, including the police, taxation, and cor-
porate regulatory powers, were well established and even routine
by the late nineteenth century as a matter of constitutional princi-
ple.
B. Private Law and the Vested Rights Theory
Despite the emphasis on the territorial boundaries of state
power articulated in Allgeyer, it would be nearly two decades be-
fore the Supreme Court would apply similar restrictions on state
choice of law in suits between two private citizens. Differences in
the theoretical underpinnings of public and private law made terri-
torialism a more obvious guiding principle for the former than the
latter. Public law governed the relationship between a state and an
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
165 U.S. 578 (1897).
, See Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 557-58 (1902); Hooper v. California,
155 U.S. 648 (1895).46 St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 349 (1922). Justice
Holmes generally did not support territorial restrictions on state taxing power, and he
later maintained that the Cotton Compress statute was invalid only because it crossed
the line from tax to penalty. See Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collec-
tor of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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individual person subject to its authority." Because the attributes
of sovereignty were absolute, no sovereign power could ever over-
lap with the power of any other sovereign-that would be war-
and thus the sovereign's powers were territorially limited." Private
law, however, dealing with relationships between individuals, by its
definition did not directly implicate the interests of the sovereign.
As a result, theories of territorial sovereignty did not seem to be
applicable in the private law context as a limit on choice of law.
Thus, when it was said that a state's "penal" laws were unenforce-
able in other states, the clear implication was that its non-penal
laws could be enforced elsewhere-indeed, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause had been held to require as much. Justice Story's
conflict of law theories dominated understandings of the subject,
and his core idea that one state could apply another's laws as an act
of "comity" clearly showed a willingness to allow private law rules
to operate outside the place they were created.' His theory also
hinted that if a forum did not feel constrained by the demands of
comity, it could legitimately apply its own laws to a dispute that oc-
curred someplace else, so long as the Constitution did not get in
the way. In short, it is evident that territorialism was not the orga-
nizing principle in private choice of law that it was in the public law
context. A conceptual adjustment would be needed in order to
harmonize private choice of law with existing limits on the reach of
public law.
1. "Negative" Law and the Obligatio
The constitutional unification of public and private law, when it
came to state legislative jurisdiction, was made possible by redefin-
ing the exact boundary between the two domains. Private law
rules, particularly common law rules of property and contract, had
" See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity,
94 Geo. L.J. 1015, 1020 (2006) (describing the nineteenth-century understanding of
public rights as those "owned by the government-the sovereign people as a whole-
rather than in persons' individual capacities").
8 See David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an
Illusion, 17 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 99, 112-13 (1997) (describing nineteenth-century theo-
ries of international relations).
" See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) ("The mis-
leading word 'comity' has been responsible for much of the trouble. It has been fertile
in suggesting a discretion unregulated by general principles.").
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been understood as "facilitative of the will of the parties, rather
than inherently regulatory in their own right."5 The existence of
conflicts challenged the notion that the private law rules could be
inherently non-regulatory. If they were non-regulatory, there
would be no difficulty with a forum choosing to apply its own law
to some far-flung transaction, but the Court plainly saw such a dif-
ficulty. In the face of this contradiction, the Court responded by
treating state laws that create private relations as a manifestation of
public power, bounded by the same territorial limits as a state's
criminal code. Unlike a criminal law, however, private rights to
bring a cause of action redressed violations of duties owed to indi-
viduals, rather than to the state whose law created those duties.
Thus, while the law creating the duty was territorially circum-
scribed, the personal legal rights generated by the interaction of lo-
cal conduct and local law were not. They were fixed, as of a par-
ticular moment in time, and could be "brought" from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction by the person who "held" them.
This was the "vested rights" or classical theory of the conflict of
laws. It was developed chiefly by Harvard Professor Joseph H.
Beale," who served as reporter for the American Law Institute's
First Restatement of the Law of the Conflict of Laws. Its great
champion on the Supreme Court was Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who, consistent with the classical legal era, preferred the
Roman term "obligatio" to refer to the plaintiff's right of action.52
The vested rights theory's primary attraction was that it provided a
way to explain how a state could hear a cause of action created by
another state's laws without offending the principle of strictly
bounded sovereign powers.
In 1914, the theory acquired Allgeyer's constitutional force in the
case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, which invalidated
Duncan Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought 268 (1998).
See Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935). Beale drew heav-
ily upon the work of British jurist A.V. Dicey. See A.V. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of
England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (1896).
2See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) ("The theory of the
foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force
in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which ... follows the person,
and may be enforced wherever the person may be found."); W. Union Tel. Co. v.
Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914); Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912);
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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the application of Missouri insurance law by Missouri courts to an
insurance contract said to have been made in New York.53 In a
unanimous opinion, the Court held that the insurance company's
obligations on the policy were defined by the laws of New York at
the time the insurance policy was made. The use of Missouri law to
determine the scope of the insurance agreement would add to the
insurance company's substantive obligations, and this would be an
impermissible interference with the company's "freedom of con-
tract."54 Building upon this notion in subsequent cases, the Court
went on to hold that a forum state could not prevent a defendant
from raising a substantive defense to a cause of action that would
have been allowed under the law of the state that created the cause
of action.5 That too would illegitimately expand the scope of the
defendant's legal obligation to the plaintiff.
The Court also spelled out an important corollary to its territori-
alist theory of law. While only the law of the place where a cause of
action accrued could determine the substantive obligations of the
parties, the state providing a forum to hear their dispute had exclu-
sive power to determine the remedies and procedure associated
with litigating it. Thus, for example, the Court held that a state or-
dinarily could not prevent a cause of action created by its law and
arising within the state from being brought in another state 6.5 The
state where the parties had interacted could alter the legal relation-
ship between them, but it could not affect the manner in which the
relationship was enforced elsewhere.
By prohibiting a state from applying its substantive law to a
given controversy, Head and its progeny at most asked states to
recognize what might be thought of as the "negative" law of other
states 7.5 The cases asked one state to echo the other state's legisla-
53234 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1914).
Id. at 157.
15 See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta*& Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143,
149-50 (1934); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160, 163 (1932);
N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1918).56See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 56 (1909); cf. Bonaparte v. Tax Court,
104 U.S. 592, 592-93 (1881) (holding that state-issued bonds could not be made tax
exempt in other states by the issuing state).
17 E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 393, 399 (1924); Dodge, 246
U.S. at 358.
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tive silence and enforce the sister state's default rule of permissive-
ness. In that sense, they still closely resembled Allgeyer, which de-
manded only that the adjudicating state sit on its hands, not that it
actively enforce the enacted law of a sister state. The more compli-
cated proposition, however, would be determining when a forum
state had to apply the "affirmative" law of another state, using the
other state's law as a rule of decision-an idea in tension with the
theory of strict territorialism and one that caused the Court great
difficulties.
2. "Affirmative" Law and the Public Policy Exception
While Head held that a forum state could not supply a remedy
when no right of action had accrued to begin with, the converse
was not true. The law of the forum might not provide a remedy
even though the plaintiff had brought a valid claim for recovery
into its courts. Admittedly, this did not formally prohibit a forum
state from providing recovery in excess of what could have been
had in the state whose law created the right to sue, even though
Head prevented forum states from enlarging the substantive obli-
gation of a defendant. Most commonly, for example, the forum
state might have a more generous statute of limitations than the
state where the cause of action arose, which would for all practical
purposes extend a plaintiff's right of recovery.58 By the same token,
though, a potential forum might just as easily have a shorter statute
of limitations, preventing a suit from going forward. The net effect
on liability of these kinds of rules might plausibly be thought to be
a wash.
The most significant "procedural" rule of a forum state, how-
ever, was whether it would be willing to serve as a forum at all, and
this remedial power only worked in one direction. The so-called
public policy exception permitted a forum state to withhold a
plaintiff's remedy if the forum disapproved of the substantive
grounds of the plaintiff's recovery. In Union Trust Co. v. Grosman,
for example, Justice Holmes upheld a Texas court's judgment that
.See Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 312, 312 (1839). The Court was also willing to permit a state to defend against
tort liability to enforce a contractual waiver of liability that was unenforceable in the
forum state. See, e.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477 (1903).
2008] 1523
1524 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 94:1509
a woman could not be held to a contract that she had signed in Illi-
nois to guarantee her husband's debt.59 While Illinois permitted
women to alienate their marital property, Texas adhered to tradi-
tional common law coverture rules, and was not obliged to enforce
the Illinois obligation when it conflicted with local public policy.'
The Supreme Court was willing to permit states in at least some
circumstances to afford additional substantive defenses to causes of
action arising under the laws of another state or simply to refuse to
hear the plaintiff's suit at all. The Court gave forum states the
power to limit liability but denied them the power to increase it.
The public policy exception proved one of the most persistent
trouble spots in the constitutional regime of vested rights, and it
was high on the syllabus of errors later drawn up by critics of the
vested rights approach. A state had to recognize relevant sister
state negative law, but thanks to the public policy exception, the
same could not be said of sister state affirmative law. As a subcon-
stitutional idea, the public policy exception was fairly consistent
with traditional territorialism: no government had to enforce an-
other's law against its will. Once the vested rights theory assumed a
constitutional cast, however, the discretion not to honor another
state's law became more problematic. As Beale himself put it, "no
law can exist as such except the law of the land; but.., it is a prin-
ciple of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected."6
The Court varied in its approach to the issue.62 It reversed lower
federal courts when they held that certain suits were offensive to
" 245 U.S. 412,417 (1918).
' Indeed, because the woman was a Texas citizen, traditional common law rules
might have suggested that Illinois should have looked to Texas law to determine the
woman's capacity to contract. Justice Holmes noted that if suit had been brought in
Illinois, the contract might have been given effect "by physical force." Id. at 415-16.
6 Beale, supra note 51, § 51; see also Dicey, supra note 51, at 56 ("The nature of a
right acquired under the law of any civilised country must be determined in accor-
dance with the law under which the right is acquired."); William Blackstone, 3 Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 109 ("[I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the
laws of England, that every right when with-held must have a remedy, and every in-
jury it's [sic] proper redress."); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(finding a right to have commission delivered, withholding the remedy of mandamus,
and quoting the preceding passage from Blackstone).
2 For its part, Beale's gloss on the common law required public policy objections to
be "strong." See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 612 (1934).
the policy of the states where they sat;63 it also imposed fairly strict
limits on the ability of states to close their doors to actions to en-
force the judgments of one another's courts.' When it came to ac-
tions not yet reduced to judgment, however, the Court showed
much more reluctance to impose similar restrictions.65 At least in a
suit between foreign corporations, it perceived no constitutional
difficulty in a state's refusal to hear a cause of action simply be-
cause it arose under another state's law.66
As late as the Court's 1932 decision in Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper, Justice Brandeis noted that "[t]here is room for
some play of conflicting policies" when it came to a state's willing-
ness to provide plaintiffs with a forum.67 Three years later, how-
ever, in the waning moments of the vested rights era, Justice
Brandeis qualified that statement, opining that "the room left for
the play of conflicting policies is a narrow one," and the Court for
the first time required a state to allow a foreign-created right of ac-
tion.6 Even then, a state appeared to be insulated from constitu-
tional attack so long as it could point to a policy reflected in its
statutes that did not rely on the mere fact that the cause of action
arose outside the state.69 The public policy exception was indeed
exceptional, sitting in substantial tension with the Court's approach
to choice of law questions. It blurred the line between remedies
and rights, it denied plaintiffs what was thought to be rightfully
theirs," and it required federal courts to determine the compatibil-
ity of one state's laws with another's. Above all, it introduced a
'See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co, v. Nichols, 264 U.S. 348, 353 (1924);
Stewart v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 168 U.S. 445, 445 (1897); Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Cox,
145 U.S. 593, 604-05 (1892).
See Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U.S. 411, 414 (1920); Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,237 (1908).
See, e.g., Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927).
Anglo-Am. Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
67286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935).
69See Clark v. Willard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935).
70 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110-11 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) ("If a
foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no rea-
son for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him.").
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doctrine into choice of law inquiries that was unconstrained by the
kind of firm formal rules that defined the vested rights approach."
C. From Contract to Status: Due Process or Full Faith and Credit?
At times, the Court's choice of law decisions suggested a consti-
tutional doctrine in search of a textual home. In Head, for instance,
Justice White had trouble locating the source of the territorial limi-
tation on state power, and reasoned impressionistically, noting that
the "principle ... [that] lies at the foundation" of the Court's full
faith and credit jurisprudence, "is illustrated" by Allgeyer's free-
dom-of-contract principle, and "finds expression" in the due proc-
ess limitations suggested by Pennoyer v. Neff and the taxation
cases.12 In fact, the Court used the Due Process Clause and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in different ways and to different effect.
The rule of due process was the simpler of the two. The Due Proc-
ess Clause was used as the source of the principle that a state law
could not be applied to property or occurrences beyond the bor-
ders of the state. It was the preferred mechanism for upholding the
negative law of a sister state. Due process was never invoked as a
limitation on a forum's ability to decline to hear a foreign-created
cause of action.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was used to require a forum to
apply the affirmative law of another jurisdiction, rather than simply
to refrain from using its own. This use took three different forms.
First, full faith and credit was used in order to require one state to
recognize a cause of action acquired in another state, either in the
form of a judgment rendered by the other state's courts or in the
form of an accrued cause of action not yet reduced to judgment.
This use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, particularly for causes
of action not reduced to judgment, was relatively weak because of
the availability of the public policy exception. Second, the clause
was used to force a forum state to recognize ways in which the law
creating a cause of action imposed substantive limitations on the
"' See Herbert F. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. Va. L.Q.
156, 170 (1929); Arthur Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Con-
flict of Laws, 49 Yale L.J. 1027, 1027-28 (1940); Note, The Public Policy Concept in
the Conflict of Laws, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 463,508 (1933).72N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149,161-62 (1914).
cause of action.73 This was in many ways a junior version of the
negative foreign law principle at work in the due process cases,
which helps explain both why the Full Faith and Credit Clause
packed a stronger punch where it was used defensively-rather
than as the basis for a cause of action-and why due process and
full faith and credit could seem confusingly interchangeable, even
to the Court.
7 4
The final, and arguably the most significant, way in which the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was used concerned situations where
one state's laws sought to alter the effect that future occurrences
would have on the legal rights of its citizens. In a sense, these were
cases concerned with status or capacity, attributes that under tradi-
tional choice of law rules were determined by the law of a person's
state of domicil. Applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
status questions permitted a person's home state to project its law
extraterritorially in a fashion somewhat reminiscent of the
"statuist" approach to conflicts of law of medieval continental
law. 5 Yet the Court gave comparatively weak full faith and credit
protection to domicil law when it came to conventional issues of
status, like marriage, mental competence, adoption, and legiti-
macy." Rather, the Court deployed the Full Faith and Credit
" John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178,182-83 (1936).
71 Perhaps this explains the occasional reference to the "due faith and credit clause."
E.g., Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386, 395 (1910); Wabash R.R. Co. v. Flannigan,
192 U.S. 29, 37 (1904); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1892); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 238-39, 242-45 (1908) (White, J., dissenting).
" Medieval European law resolved many conflicts of law by looking to the law of a
person's citizenship or tribal membership. See Mills, supra note 23, at 7. Notice that
the words "statute," "status," and "estate" share the same root. Part of the explana-
tion for this apparent extraterritoriality may lie in the remedies available to protect
the status created by the domicil. Each of these could be protected by courts of eq-
uity, which were not territorially limited because they were said to "act upon the per-
son." See Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 Va. L. Rev.
747, 804-805 (1998).
76 In Grosman, Justice Holmes did hint that a contract entered into by a married
woman outside her domicile might not be valid even in the state where the contract
was made when the law of her domicile denied her the power to make such a contract.
Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 416 (1918). Traditional status rules could
be used to support both the majority's and the dissent's position in Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), but the Court repeatedly sought to ensure that each
state had complete control over the disposition of land within its borders, and it there-
fore held that sister states could not act to transfer ownership of real property to their
domiciliaries when they were disabled from holding it under the laws of the state
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Clause by recognizing new forms of status, typically arising out of
some kind of enduring relationship whose center of gravity lay
within a state and that altered the legal effect of subsequent ac-
tions.77 Thus, the Court required states to use another state's law to
determine the obligations of beneficial fraternal organizations to
their members,78 the personal liability of corporate stockholders,7 9
and the right of injured employees to recover from their employ-
ers."o In Justice Holmes's view, a fraternal benefit society was like a
kind of economic matrimony: "The act of becoming a member is
something more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and
abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicil, membership
looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting the
incorporation." 81
To see how due process and full faith and credit doctrines inter-
acted, consider the case of Bradford v. Clapper, in which a Ver-
mont resident, working for a Vermont-based power company, was
electrocuted while carrying out an assignment in New Hampshire.'
While Vermont's workers' compensation statute had eliminated
common law tort liability, New Hampshire's had not, and so there
would be no violation of due process territorialism by allowing
New Hampshire to give the worker's estate a cause of action
against his employer. In an innovative opinion, Justice Brandeis
ruled that an employment relationship was a kind of status, at least
where the workers' compensation regime was in place.83 Thus,
while the Due Process Clause did not forbid application of New
Hampshire law, the Full Faith and Credit Clause did.
where the property was situated. See Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386; Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1
(1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
71 Indeed, the first Supreme Court opinion to state that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applied to sister state statutes dealt with one state's determination of the scope
of the powers that a corporation had been authorized to exercise by the state that cre-
ated it. See Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615 (1887).
78 See Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Supreme Council of
the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).79 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243
(1912).
See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
81 Modern Woodmen, 267 U.S. at 551.
286 U.S. 145.
Id. at 157-58.
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In these cases, the Court was moved by the apparent need for a
uniform legal rule to govern a complex relationship affecting mul-
tiple parties. Yet, in the kinds of cases where these issues were liti-
gated, the Due Process Clause typically could not be used to police
state choice of law because some sort of legally significant event
did occur within the forum state. Full faith and credit could be used
to require the forum state to recognize the ways in which its own
law was preempted by some larger relationship governed by the
laws of some other state.
D. Federal Questions
If all that were required to enforce the Supreme Court's territo-
rial vision of law was a commitment to the principle that no state's
laws could operate beyond its territory, the Court's task in super-
vising state choice of law would have been easy. Unfortunately for
the Court, however, enunciating the principle of non-
extraterritoriality was only the first step in what could be a com-
plex and baffling inquiry. In choice of law cases, there were at least
six subsidiary questions the Court potentially had to answer under
the territorial scheme it had embraced.
First, there was the question of whether the cause of action was
of a kind that a sister state could adjudicate. Was a wrongful death
statute that allowed a plaintiff to recover a fixed level of damages
penal or compensatory? Was a bequest of real property a question
of local property law, or a question of the law of wills and trusts?
Was a state's declaration that a particular cause of action created
by its laws could not be brought in other states a procedural limita-
tion, in which case it had no force if the action would have been
considered "transitory" at common law, or a substantive one, in
which case it did?
Second, assuming the forum could hear the claim, there was the
question of the class of controversy within which the particular le-
gal dispute fell. Was the failure to perform a contract for the sale of
land within the state a contract claim or a property claim? Was an
agreement to waive tort liability a defense to a tort action, or was it
only an independent legal action that would have to be enforced by
means of a separate legal action in contract law? Was a statute of
limitations that applied only to a particular cause of action proce-
dural or substantive? Was an agreement between an insurance
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company and a merchant to insure a particular shipment of goods
for a particular price an independent contract when the two parties
had already entered into a general contract that the company
would act as the merchant's insurer, or merely an incident of their
standing agreement?
Third, there was the question of what the rule was for selecting
the state whose law governed that category of disputes. Was the
question involved status-based, and hence governed by the law of
the state of domicil, or was it event- or transaction-based, and
therefore governed by the place where the event or transaction
took place?
Fourth, having placed the right of action into one of those cate-
gories, there was the question of how to determine what the domi-
cil or place of transacting was. Marriage might be governed by the
law of the state of domicil, but what is the domicil of a married
couple who have separated and are living in different states? Was a
suit for breach of contract to be decided under the law of the place
where the breach allegedly occurred, by the place where a message
of acceptance was placed in the mail, or by the place where the
message was received?
Fifth, having selected the state whose law governed the dispute,
there was the question of what the law of that jurisdiction actually
was. Was a misinterpretation of sister state law a constitutional vio-
lation?
Sixth and finally, there was the question of whether a forum's re-
fusal on grounds of public policy to enforce a cause of action cre-
ated under another state's law was a valid exercise of its sovereign
prerogatives.
In short, territorialism may have seemed like an obvious and
straightforward way to select between the competing claims of dif-
ferent states to govern the same subjects, but in practice, it pre-
sented a host of difficult questions. To be sure, Beale and others
had formulated answers to many of them as a matter of ordinary
common law. Doctrinal issues-for example, what law governs ca-
pacity to make a contract?-could be solved by incorporating them
as federal rights. Much trickier, however, were questions relating
to the application of the doctrine-for example, was a loan agree-
ment, using a life insurance policy as security for the loan, a free-
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standing contract when the right to borrow against the policy was
included in the terms of the life insurance policy?
It is unclear how committed the Court was to bringing the entire
choice of law inquiry under the federal umbrella. Certainly, the
principle of non-extraterritoriality was enforced as a constitutional
limitation, and in particular as a requirement of due process. 8, At
the very least, this meant that state courts and legislatures could
not regulate matters that they acknowledged to be beyond their
borders. If states were nonetheless permitted to redefine the loca-
tion of the subjects of regulation, however, the requirement would
obviously lose a great deal of its force. The Court therefore found
it necessary in at least some cases to review both the articulation
and the application of jurisdiction-selecting rules by the states, de-
spite once holding that "a mistaken application of doctrines of the
conflict of laws ..., being purely a question of local common law,
is a matter with which this court is not concerned."85 A state, for
example, could not simply declare that a contract was made within
its borders and thereby satisfy the requirements of due process.
What is less apparent is whether the rules for selecting the appro-
priate state were thought to be constitutionally hard-wired or
whether they amounted to a kind of federal common law.86 Given
' See supra Subsection I.B.1.
8 Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (Brandeis, J.). Contrast Justice
Brandeis's opinions in Bradford, 286 U.S. 145, and Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397 (1930), both of which overturned the application of forum law by state
courts. Because the Court in Kryger was being asked to reverse a state court decision
to apply the forum's law to a contract for the sale of land located within the forum, a
full faith and credit challenge might have been more persuasive than a due process
challenge, but only the latter challenge was made. Also worth noting is that in Kryger,
the cases Justice Brandeis cited as authorities for the non-reviewability of state choice
of law concerned decisions declining to review one state's interpretation of another
state's law, not its antecedent rule for selecting the proper state whose law was to
govern.
m In the days before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal
courts may well have felt empowered to interpret anew a state's view of "general
common law," at least where federal jurisdiction could be asserted. Consider that one
area where federal courts frequcntly functioned as common law courts was in cases
involving marine insurance contracts, precisely the subject matter at issue in Allgeyer.
See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1539 (1984)
("The federal courts were always conscious in marine insurance cases that they were
developing and administering a system of general common law that they shared with
the state courts.").
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Congress's power to legislate pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the latter seems more likely, but since Congress never
passed any such legislation, the answer cannot be known.
The Court apparently was aware of at least some of the thorni-
ness that it faced in reviewing state choice of law,87 as evidenced by
its consistent refusal to review one state's interpretation of another
state's law. So long as a state purported to decide a particular ques-
tion under the right law, the Supreme Court would not review the
correctness of its actual application of that law.' Finally, as we
have seen, the Court saw the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a limit
on states' ability to abstain on public policy grounds from enforcing
the laws of sister states.89 Although the Court failed to craft precise
limits on the public policy exception, it was willing to place some
limits on states' ability to side with defendants on grounds of states'
own local policy-even as it refused to review one state's interpre-
tation of another's law.
This, then, was the system the Supreme Court developed to re-
view state choice of law, incorporating positivist conceptions of
sovereignty and international relations, traditional common law
doctrines, and contemporary choice of law theories into a frame-
work of federal rights enforceable by individuals against states. Al-
though it was not inconsistent with the Court's case law earlier in
the nineteenth century, it did not really blossom until the height of
the Lochner Era. As we shall see, at precisely the moment the
Lochner Era gave way to the New Deal Constitution and its ap-
proach to economic regulation, the territorialist, vested rights sys-
tem the Court had adopted was cast off in favor of the permissive
approach the Supreme Court has maintained ever since.
'But see Henry Schofield, The Supreme Court of the United States and the En-
forcement of State Law by State Courts, 3 Ill. L. Rev. 195, 195 (1908) (arguing for Su-
preme Court review of errors of state law by state courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
" See Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 463-65 (1905); Johnson v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 187 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1903); Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U.S. 222 (1894); see also
Note, Misconstruction of Sister State Law in Conflict of Laws, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 653
(1960).
" See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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II. WHAT LOCHNER TEACHES ABOUT CHOICE OF LAW
Was the Supreme Court "Lochnering" in the field of choice of
law? The answer may prove important, but it is not one that cur-
rent choice of law literature has sought to provide. Other than the
initial barrage of criticism decades ago that was designed to dis-
credit the entire classical enterprise in the choice of law field, legal
commentators have largely ignored the Lochner Court's choice of
law opinions. It is time to reexamine the Supreme Court's Lochner
Era choice of law decisions in order more clearly to understand
what the Court was up to-and why. There are several reasons why
such a reexamination is necessary. First, choice of law theorists by
and large ignore the extent to which incorporating common law
choice of law doctrines as positive constitutional law might have
strengthened-or weakened-the logical foundation on which
those doctrines rested. 9 Attacking choice of law questions as a con-
stitutional problem alters the analytic and political justifications
behind the vested rights system. To the extent that the classical ap-
proach has been judged only as a set of doctrines a state imposes
on itself, rather than as a set of restrictions mandated by federal
law, those judgments are incomplete.
Second, and more importantly, the so-called "choice of law revo-
lution," in which the vested rights system was overthrown and re-
placed with a system that seeks to evaluate the strength of a state's
interest in having its law resolve a particular legal question,9 re-
mains controversial. A number of state courts have chosen to ad-
here to some version of the vested rights system,92 and academics
have heaped criticism on the modern "interests analysis" approach
to choice of law93 and on constitutional inattention to choice of law
See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
9' See Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 183-184 (1963).
See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2005: Nine-
teenth Annual Survey, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 559, 595 (2005). For a vivid judicial datum,
see Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 1986) ("Lex loci delicti has long
been the cornerstone of our conflict of laws doctrine. The consistency, predictability,
and ease of application provided by the traditional doctrine are not to be discarded
lightly, and we are not persuaded that we should discard them today.").
93See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 459 (1985); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness,"
and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1191 (1987); Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws:
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questions. ' Yet despite calls for greater constitutional involvement
in choice of law, scholarly analysis of the only period in which con-
stitutional limits were actually imposed on state choice of law has
been cursory at best.
Lastly, Lochner Era choice of law doctrine has been misunder-
stood. Several prominent choice of law scholars have advocated
principles reminiscent of the classical approach to choice of law,
but in the course of advancing their own theories, those scholars
have been at pains to distinguish their views from it, in some cases
mischaracterizing the classical scheme in the course of doing so.
Professor Lea Brilmayer argues that her "political rights model"
differs in two respects from the traditional vested rights theory.
First, her model creates individual rights against the state, rather
than against other individuals. As we have seen, however, recog-
nizing the "public" aspect of private law was essential to the crea-
tion of the Lochner Era choice of law regime. Second, Brilmayer
notes that her model is principally concerned with prohibitions on
government action, rather than requirements that the government
affirmatively act in a particular way.95 But this, too, was a basic fea-
ture of the Lochner Era system, most obviously in the public policy
exception to a state's obligation to provide a remedy to a plaintiff
bringing an out-of-state cause of action.96
Professor Douglas Laycock, meanwhile, has sought to reestab-
lish territorialism as a constitutional limit on state choice of law,
but he rejects the notion of the vesting of rights as "crude" and
A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1984); Harold L. Korn, The
Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 772 (1983).
' See John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173 (1981); Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints on
State Choice of Law, 24 U. Dayton L. Rev. 39 (1998); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Ju-
risprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 651 (1987); Laycock, supra note 2; James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry
About Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1299 (1987); Kermit Roose-
velt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2448
(1999); Shreve, supra note 2.
95Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1277, 1296
(1989).
" In addition, Part III.A., infra, will show that deontological concerns, which Bril-
mayer views as a distinctive concern of her approach to choice of law, were not far
from the surface in the Lochner Era choice of law cases.
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"mindless conceptualism."' Territorialism can be made appropri-
ately sophisticated, he says, by incorporating "the principal insight"
of modern interests-analysis theories of choice of law: "the signifi-
cance of relationships."98 Yet as the Court's innovative approach to
"status" relations in cases like Bradford v. Clapper shows, the im-
portance of relationships between individuals that are more juris-
dictionally significant than discrete events was apparent to the
Court and was an important part of its doctrine. Finally, Professor
Perry Dane has argued in favor of "vestedness" as a solution to
choice of law questions but he notes that his theory has "nothing
whatsoever to say" about classical territorialism, which may sound
like a more significant difference than it actually is insofar as the
actual "location" of a particular legal controversy could be defined
in surprisingly creative ways.
This Note makes no attempt to assess the merits or desirability
of the classical system. These observations about contemporary
choice of law debates are merely offered to suggest that a failure to
examine how Lochner Era constitutional choice of law doctrines
operated has distorted the debate over the way courts today ought
to proceed when confronting choice of law problems. Whether be-
cause of reflexive hostility toward the Lochner Court or simple
lack of interest, it is clear that association with a discredited period
in American constitutional law makes it easy to dismiss the pre-
New Deal choice of law doctrine without appreciating all of its nu-
ances.1" It is therefore necessary to address the extent to which the
Supreme Court's decisions relating to choice of law are susceptible
to the traditional criticisms of Lochner Era constitutional law.
At the outset, it is helpful to understand what the Court under-
stood itself to be doing as a matter of legal analysis in setting forth
9 Laycock, supra note 2, at 322.
98Id. at 324.
9 Dane, supra note 93, at 1209.
,"See sources cited supra note 9. Indeed, even the "vested rights" name given to
this line of doctrine is misleading to the extent that it evokes notions of the Supreme
Court as guardian of property rights. See Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of
American Constitutional Law, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247, 275 (1914); James W. Ely, Jr.,
The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights 80
(1992). In the context of the Court's choice of law decisions, a better name might have
been the "no vested right" doctrine, since it was the award of judgments in the ab-
sence of a vested right that concerned the Court.
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its choice of law rules. To some extent, the answer is straightfor-
ward. Whether or not the Court's Full Faith and Credit Clause
holdings are defensible in their particulars, there is no question
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is relevant to the choice of
law issue. Whatever the Court's motivations and whatever the
quality of its reasoning, the Court's function could plausibly be de-
scribed as interpreting the meaning of an important portion of the
constitutional text.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, however, are not as obviously connected to the choice of
law problem. Understanding what made the Due Process Clauses
seem to the Lochner Era Court like an appropriate vehicle to im-
pose choice of law limitations is the best way to understand what
its members thought choice of law was all about. Broadly speaking,
there are three basic ways in which "due process" operates. 1 The
first, a "positivist" view, holds that due process only prevents ex-
ecutive and judicial officers from acting without legislative authori-
zation. The process required is simply the "rule of law." The sec-
ond, a "procedural" view, goes further, severing the scope of the
legal interest protected by the due process guarantee from the ac-
ceptability of the procedures that must be followed before that in-
terest can be taken away. On this view, a judge may invalidate the
procedural requirements that a legislature requires courts and ex-
ecutive branch officials to follow before invading a protected inter-
est if the judge considers the procedures inadequate or unfair. Fi-
nally, a "substantive" approach to due process calls upon judges to
refer to their own views of what governments may or may not le-
gitimately do and to invalidate legislation that exceeds those pow-
ers, essentially removing considerations of procedure from the
equation.
Attempting to place Lochner Era choice of law doctrine into one
of these categories illustrates just how difficult it can be to separate
substance and procedure, for it is hard to say definitively which ac-
count best describes what the Court was doing in its due process
choice of law cases. Requiring executive and judicial officers to ad-
"0' For a more sophisticated typology of due process understandings, see the excel-
lent discussion in John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional
Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493,504-543 (1997).
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here to enacted law, as a positivist understanding does, fails to an-
swer the question of which law a government actor ought to be fol-
lowing. Some baseline choice of law rule must itself be posited in
order to select which substantive rule to apply."° The Court's
choice of law decisions therefore are not necessarily inconsistent
with a positivist take on due process, even if the Court was articu-
lating choice of law rules it derived from legal "first principles,"
rather than from positive law. The choice of law decisions could
also be described as examples of procedural due process, since they
dealt with what were essentially jurisdictional questions, pertaining
to the process of adjudicating disputes. Finally, the idea that the
enforcement of extraterritorial legislation could never provide due
process of law had an important substantive dimension. Although
the restriction was based on geography, rather than subject matter,
it nonetheless absolutely prevented legislative bodies from govern-
ing certain matters in any way.
That said, the rule of non-extraterritoriality articulated by the
Court is probably most consistent with a positivist take on due
process. Unlike true substantive due process, it left intact the abil-
ity of some state to govern the matter at hand, as long as the state
had the proper relationship to it. And unlike procedural due proc-
ess, the Court largely avoided the language of procedural fairness
in justifying its holdings. Instead, the Court seems to have under-
stood the non-extraterritoriality principle as an unwritten constitu-
tional presupposition, not unlike the principle of sovereign immu-
nity. 3 Perhaps because of limitations thought to be inherent in the
nature of sovereignty, perhaps because of the nature of America's
constitutional union, but most likely because it was simply incon-
ceivable to the Court that a person could be governed by two valid
102 Perhaps this can be seen most clearly with respect to preemption questions. The
enforcement of an unconstitutional state law would presumably not be due process of
law, despite a state legislature's having enacted it, because the Constitution is the "su-
preme law of the land" and renders invalid the legislature's action. The constitutional
text does not offer a correspondingly clear rule about interstate conflicts of law, but to
say that this permits a state to make up its own rule is itself to make a choice of law
judgment (that the forum state gets to make its own rule). This is the very issue ex-
plicitly decided for federal courts sitting in diversity by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 492 (1941). In short, a choice of law is unavoidable
if due process has any meaning at all.
13 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) ("It is inherent in the nature of sov-
ereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.").
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but conflicting legal regimes at the same time, states were thought
to be incapable of governing matters beyond their borders. In that
sense, it is not entirely a stretch to say that the Due Process
Clause-historically understood as the "the law of the land""-
literally meant matching law with land.
Given the complexity of the Court's approach to due process in
the choice of law cases and the roots of Lochner v. New York's
substantive form of due process in cases like Allgeyer, it is impor-
tant to consider how the choice of law decisions compare with the
traditional complaints lodged against the Lochner Era Court.
Broadly speaking, there are four basic criticisms of the Lochner
Court, which are set out below. While the validity of these com-
plaints has arguably been qualified by recent revisionist scholar-
ship, they are still the basic elements in a charge of "Lochnering."
What follows is an investigation into whether received opinion on
Lochner provides much guidance in understanding the choice of
law cases and the extent to which those cases are symptomatic of
the disease of Lochnerism. A careful analysis reveals that while the
Court's choice of law doctrine is not entirely immune to the tradi-
tional criticisms of Lochner, by and large those criticisms do not
provide a useful way to describe or evaluate the Lochner Court's
choice of law doctrine.
A. Naked Judicial Preferences
The first of the classic objections to the Lochner Court is that it
played politics in the guise of constitutional decisionmaking and
that its members were either naive or, more likely, disingenuous
when they claimed that their hostility to Progressive regulation was
based on legal interpretation rather than personal political views.
" See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1908); Murray's Lessee v. Hobo-
ken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856); see also Edward
Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 50 (W. Hein & Co.
1986) (1809); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev.
85, 95-96.
' See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spenser's Social Statics.");
see also Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 11-38 (1908); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson
of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383, 1385 (2001) ("Courts that appear to be substitut-
ing their own view of desirable social policy for that of elected officials often are said
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Professor Robert Sedler has explicitly extended this critique to the
choice of law cases, asserting that the Court's aim was to protect
big business.'" While it is impossible to know what really went
through the heads of the Justices of the Lochner Court, the cases in
which those doctrines were developed can at least be examined to
see whether they are inconsistent with an "attitudinal" explana-
tion."
Certainly there is some evidence to support such a claim. The
Court in numerous decisions acted to protect corporations-
insurance companies, most notably-from regulation by states. At
a more general level, one of the most significant features of the
vested rights approach to the conflict of laws-and one which has
not been noted by conflicts of laws scholars-is the way in which it
was inherently liability-limiting.'8 A state asked to provide a rem-
edy for a private wrong had significantly more leeway to restrict a
plaintiff's recovery than to expand it. To put it another way, Grant
Gilmore's characterization of Justice Holmes's approach to con-
tract law, as "dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no one
should be liable to anyone for anything,"" could just as easily be
applied to Justice Holmes's conflict of laws decisions. ' The classi-
cal choice of law rules the Court adopted were not neutral with re-
to Lochnerize."); Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legisla-
tion, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 545, 545-46 (1924); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1697 (1984) ("In the Lochner era, the Court
attempted to create a separate category of impermissible ends, using the libertarian
framework of the common law as a theoretical basis.").
,' See Sedler, supra note 9, at 67. Consider also Judge Jerome Frank's remark that
Joseph Beale was "the right wing of the right wing." Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at
Yale: 1927-1960, at 26 (1986) (quoting Frank).
,07See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model (1993).
'O Professor Brilmayer has criticized modem-day interest analysis on the grounds
that it is "pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery." Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analy-
sis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392, 398 (1980). While her
claim might be taken to imply that the alternatives would be less "pro-recovery," it
does not convey the degree to which the vested rights approach tilted against plain-
tiffs as a formal matter. Modern interest analysis allows a forum state to decide uni-
laterally whether to allow liability or not. Under the vested rights system, by contrast,
both the state where the litigated events took place and the forum state had to agree
to allow the plaintiff to recover.
, Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 14 (1974).
"
0 Not that Justice Holmes always sided with defendants. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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spect to the conflict between plaintiffs and defendants, and to the
extent that defendants in cases presenting difficult choice of law
questions were likely to be corporations, the classical system pro-
tected their interests."'
Nonetheless, the vested rights theory cannot be explained away
as a manifestation of laissez-faire politics. For one thing, the fact
that Justice Holmes-who memorably dissented in Lochner-was
a leading proponent of the vested rights approach suggests that the
choice of law cases were about something other than the protection
of capitalism from Progressive regulation."2 In fact, both Justice
Holmes and his progressive colleague Justice Louis Brandeis were
willing to work within the territorialist system in order to secure in-
strumental goals, as they did in the cases creating new forms of
status for workers' compensation (Brandeis) and fraternal benefit
societies (Holmes). Justice Brandeis himself came to support the
way the strictly territorialist scheme discouraged forum-shopping,
thwarting attempts to escape innovative regulatory schemes
adopted by states.' Nor were the beneficiaries of the system sim-
ply business interests. Union Trust v. Grosman, for example, pro-
... These cases might also be compared to the development of common law tort doc-
trines during the nineteenth century, which has been explained by some scholars as an
attempt by courts to subsidize the growth of American industry by limiting tort liabil-
ity. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 85-
89 (1977); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 473 (2d ed.
1985). More recent scholarship has challenged this "subsidy thesis," however. See,
e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America:
A Reinterpretation, 90 Yale L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981) ("[T]he nineteenth century negli-
gence system was applied with impressive sternness to major industries and that tort
law exhibited a keen concern for victim welfare."); see also G. Edward White, Tort
Law in America: An Intellectual History 3 (1980) (attributing much of the develop-
ment of nineteenth century tort doctrine to jurisprudential and conceptual factors).
112 Moreover, Justice John Marshall Harlan, author of Lochner's other dissent, was
similarly an advocate of territorialism. Allgeyer's freedom of contract was taken from
Justice Harlan's dissent in a similar case in which he would have invalidated a state
law on the grounds that it operated extraterritorially. See Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, 664 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the
Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America
152 (2000). With respect to Erie, it is worth noting that the only dissenters from Erie's
decision in favor of the Erie Railroad Company and against the severely injured
Harry Tompkins were Justices Pierce Butler and James McReynolds, the only two of
the "four horsemen" hostile to President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal still on the
Court at the time. Erie, 304 U.S. at 81 (Butler & McReynolds, JJ., dissenting).
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tected an individual from suit by creditors, albeit by means of ret-
rograde restrictions on women's property ownership."' Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the effects of the system were muted.
Unlike its fundamental rights decisions, the Court's strict territori-
alism did not shield activities from state regulation altogether, only
regulation by the "wrong" state. The claim that the Court was
merely acting to protect powerful economic interests or advance
the free market does not convincingly describe the nature of its de-
cisions and doctrines.
B. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty
The second family of criticisms of the Lochner Era Supreme
Court charges that the Court failed to appreciate the proper role of
judges in a democratic system.11 On this argument, the Court ought
to have shown more restraint before acting to overrule the deci-
sions of politically accountable lawmakers on matters of public pol-
icy. In the context of state choice of law, this criticism again lacks
some of the force that the Court's substantive due process deci-
sions might lend to such a charge. With respect to legislative action
purporting to regulate matters outside the state, Supreme Court
invalidation did not prevent the state within whose territory the
subject matter was said to rest from regulating it in whatever way
the state saw fit. With respect to judicial choice of law, made by
state court judges in the absence of legislative direction, the state
policy being overridden was not legislative to begin with and the
risk of setting aside the will of popular majorities is much lower
since such procedural questions seldom motivate voters on Elec-
tion Day. With respect to legislative attempts to reach subjects out-
side the state, the problem of overruling democratic majorities also
seems fairly minimal since those laws would typically affect citizens
1 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
115 See Strauss, supra note 8, at 386 ("The justices' failure was in a sense a lack of
humility: an inability, or refusal, to understand that although they were vindicating an
important value, matters were more complicated than they thought."); see also Alex-
ander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 16-17 (1962).
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of other states, who had no opportunity to participate in the politi-
cal process that generated the law."6
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Court's choice of law
decisionmaking from the standpoint of democratic accountability is
its willingness to require a state to enforce a law that the state con-
sidered incompatible with its own local policy."7 As we have seen,
however, the Court showed tremendous reluctance to second guess
state court invocations of the "public policy exception." Moreover,
constraining the public policy exception was the only way in which
to make what was otherwise a pro-defendant choice of law regime
more party-neutral, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided
a textual rationale for this oversight. Not only that, federal courts
sitting in diversity were required to judge a state's policy interests
anyway, both before"8 and after"9 the Court's decision in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins,2° making it impossible to avoid the issue al-
together. In short, the charge of countermajoritarianism does not
have much weight in the choice of law arena.
C. Bad Law
The third group of arguments condemning Lochner charges that
it "simply manufactured a constitutional right out of whole
cloth, '1 21 with no basis in the Constitution's text or history and no
coherence as legal doctrine12 By and large, it is difficult to criticize
the choice of law cases on these grounds. It is true that the Court
seemed to start with the premise of territorialism and to look for a
textual home for the idea, ultimately settling on the open-ended
language of due process. As a matter of original understanding,
116 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 83 (1980) ("[N]onresidents are a
paradigmatically powerless class politically.").
"' See, e.g, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934).
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 264 U. S. 348 (1924).
... See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
120304 U.S. 64 (1938).
121 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
L.J. 920, 937 (1973).
'2 See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("What is this freedom?
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract."); Friedman, supra note 105,
at 1412 ("Contrary to revisionist claims, Lochner-era decisions simply defy attempts
to divide the cases into doctrinal categories.").
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Justice Story's more flexible notions of comity, while similar to the
vested rights theory, are arguably more in line with prevailing un-
derstandings at the time the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment were ratified. Nonetheless, territorialism was well-
grounded as a principle of constitutional law and is in some sense
inescapable, since territorial boundaries are the principal way in
which we define states. The constitutional text contained numerous
provisions that strongly implied that state legislative jurisdiction
was territorial,23 and decisions affirming the notion that sovereign
power was limited by the sovereign's borders existed from the ear-
liest days of the Court .
The idea that a right of recovery might be carried from place to
place was a familiar one. English common law had long distin-
guished between "transitory" and "local" causes of action, allowing
transitory actions to be brought anywhere in the kingdom.12'5 The
concept of vested rights was equally well established. The vested
right was a key principle of the common law of property, and it
could claim a plausible constitutional home in the text of the Con-
tracts and Takings Clauses. Indeed, Progressive constitutional
theorist Edward Corwin asserted that the doctrine "represented
the essential spirit and point of view of the founders of American
Constitutional Law.
1 26
Furthermore, the common law recognized the idea of the "chose
in action," the property-like right to bring a lawsuit.12'7 According to
Blackstone,
'23 For example, the extradition clause of Article IV required each state to surrender
fugitives from criminal prosecution in another state to "the State having Jurisdiction
of the Crime." Article IV also provided that no new states would be formed "within
the Jurisdiction of any other State," strongly implying that the word "jurisdiction" was
synonymous with the state's physical borders. The idea that a legal act had a location
is also supported by the language of Article III and the Sixth Amendment, which both
require criminal trials to be held in the state where the crime alleged "shall have been
committed."
124 See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.) ("No
principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality
of nations .... It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on
another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone.").
125 See Arthur K. Kuhn, Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law,
66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 301, 303 (1918); see also Stout v. Wood, 1 Blackf. 70 (Ind. 1820).
126 Corwin, supra note 100, at 276.
127See generally William S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in
Action by the Common Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1027 (1920). Interestingly, it was
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[i]f a man promises or covenants with me to do any act, and fails
in it, whereby I suffer damage, the recompense for this damage is
a chose in action, for though a right to some recompense vests in
me at the time of the damage done, yet what and how large such
recompense shall be can only be ascertained by verdict.12
Finally, the distinction between vested rights and unvested reme-
dies was also well established. After all, if vested rights were unal-
terable, any change in law, however minute, that could limit en-
forcement of a vested right would be a violation of property or
contract rights protected by the Constitution. Thus, the Marshall
Court held that a state could prevent collection from a debtor
within the state without offending the Constitution;129 at the same
time, however, such laws could not erase the creditor's underlying
right to collect, and they could not prevent another state that was
willing to provide a remedy from doing so." Note also that making
remedies law the exclusive province of the forum state was consis-
tent with decisions like Pennoyer, which limited the jurisdiction of
state courts-the dispensers of remedies-to persons and property
within the state's borders.
In one sense, however, the Court was undertaking something
novel in its choice of law decisions. Beale ultimately insisted that
each forum was the master of its own choice of law rules and that
there were no super-national laws that govern one sovereign's
choice of law policy. He was therefore willing to permit different
courts to use different choice of law rules, with the result that
vested rights might be defined differently in different courts."'
Beale's nemesis Walter Wheeler Cook who sought to explode the notion that the
chose in action was generally inalienable. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability
of Choses in Action, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816 (1916); see also Bonaparte v. Tax Court,
104 U.S. 592, 592 (1881) (holding that a municipal bond, as a chose in action, cannot
be exempted from taxation outside the state where it had situs). The assignability of
legal claims was well enough established that the authors of the first Judiciary Act
perceived the need to make it clear that diversity of citizenship for purposes of federal
court jurisdiction would not be based upon the citizenship of a legal assignee. See Ju-
diciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11-12, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1994)).
'" 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England § 540 (1768) (em-
phasis added).
29ee Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
See M'Millan v. M'Neill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819).
'3, See Dane, supra note 93, at 1196.
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Constitutionalizing Beale's doctrines transformed them from fo-
rum policy into rules that the forum was compelled to obey by a
higher authority, regardless of the rule the forum would prefer to
enact."' Even if this amounted to a significant departure from prior
theory, however, it was not necessarily an unjustified one. Enforc-
ing Beale's rules as constitutional doctrine might be said to have
resolved the tension between sovereign power in the sense of sheer
might and sovereign power in the sense of legitimate authority. '33 In
any event, the principle of territorial limitations was well enough
established that it is hard to consider the Court's choice of law doc-
trine a radical shift away from existing legal understandings.
D. A Jurisprudence of Conceptions
A final criticism of Lochner Era constitutional law is that its
method of reasoning was overly abstract and conceptualistic."3
Consequently, judges could manipulate the results of their analyses
by means of artful characterization135 or simply succumb to the
132 See David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of
Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 324, 377 (1985) (stating that, in All-
geyer, "the due process clause had become the constitutional peg on which to hang
Justice Story's territorialist choice-of-law views"). Even if this step was not an act of
unjustified innovation, it may simply have been theoretically problematic. To the ex-
tent that Beale's theory was itself an attempt to create a choice of law rubric that was
compatible with the premise that there were no super-national rules, recasting it as
constitutional law may have undermined the case for the system and its strict separa-
tion of individual states' law-creating and law-enforcing powers as sovereigns.
"' How else can one make sense of Justice Holmes's statement that "jurisdiction is
power," Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 356 (1913), in light of his willingness
to hold that a state was without jurisdiction to apply its own law in a dispute within its
own courts, an act clearly within its "power"? Even vested rights critic Walter
Wheeler Cook, who argued that limits on a state's power to affect legal relations do
not "inhere in the constitution of the legal universe," conceded they could exist
"where some limitation is imposed by some system of positive law, such as the federal
constitution." Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 457, 484-85 (1924).1
3 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908);
see also Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day it Was Decided": Lochner and Constitu-
tional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677, 686 (2005) (describing conventional account
that "during the 'Lochner Era' courts employed a rigid formalism that neglected so-
cial realities").
131 See Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 Mich. L. Rev.
1631, 1633-34 (2005).
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"beguiling"' 116 sense of certainty that the vested rights approach en-
couraged.37 This is probably the most salient criticism that can be
lodged against the Court's conflicts of law doctrine; determining
where a particular legal relationship was created was in many cases
a highly artificial inquiry. Minute differences of contract language
could lead to opposite determinations of the proper location of a
contract."8 The idea that an insurance company was not "doing
business" in a state where it sold insurance policies by mail is diffi-
cult to swallow, all the more so when it was possible for a person to
"travel" to another state and make a contract there without doing
anything more than walking to the mailbox. In the abstract, Justice
Holmes may have been right that "[t]he injustice of imposing a
greater liability than that created by the law governing the conduct
of the parties at the time of the act or omission complained of is
obvious," '39 but where a telegraph company loses an important
message in the state in which the message was to be delivered, is it
really so unjust to subject it to suit under the law of the place from
which the message was sent?
Moreover, the Court itself began to blur the formal territorial
lines that the system was founded upon. The Court in several cases
allowed states to punish acts done outside the state but "intended
to produce and producing detrimental effects within it."1" The idea
that acting with the intention to affect matters within the legislative
competence of a particular lawmaking body brought a person oth-
erwise beyond the body's reach within it was not unprecedented in
the Supreme Court's decisions. ' Nonetheless, it represented a re-
treat from the strict territorialism that supported the vested rights
system. Moreover, a requirement of purpose soon gave way to
36 James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci Doc-
trine, The Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. Va. L. Rev. 957,
959 (1991).
"' Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of
Formalism, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 925,956-57 (2004).
"' Compare N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918), with Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
'
3 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914).
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
141 Compare Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925), with
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
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mere foreseeability in the context of various tort suits. 12 That the
Court itself was unwilling to adhere to the rules it announced is
strong evidence against their utility and made their selective impo-
sition all the more arbitrary. It is conceivable that the system could
have been reformed rather than discarded wholesale-as was done
in the cases recognizing new forms of status relationships entitled
to full faith and credit-but as implemented, the results often seem
unconvincing.
Certainly, each of the staple criticisms of the Lochner Era has
some applicability to the restraints the Lochner Era Court imposed
on state choice of law, but for the most part, they lack significant
persuasive or explanatory force. The only complaint that seems es-
pecially plausible is the argument that the Court's doctrine was ar-
bitrary and technical. With hindsight, this is unsurprising in light of
the premise of territorialism: if state power was defined in purely
geographic terms, it followed that every legal issue had to possess a
location-an abstract fiction that invoked the language of ordinary
perception but that existed only in the minds of lawyers. The
strictness of the Court's rules was bound to produce unpalatable
results in difficult cases, to some extent an intractable problem in
the field of choice of law, but a fact that its concrete metaphors
seemed to deny. To some extent, these were problems that nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century jurists, including Justice
Holmes, were willing to live with, for reasons that will be suggested
in Part III. By the 1930s, however, that tolerance would be a thing
of the past.
III. WHAT CHOICE OF LAW TEACHES ABOUT LOCHNER
Recent historical revisionism has significantly altered under-
standings of the ideas at work in the Lochner Era Supreme Court.
This Part will show how an examination of the choice of law cases
adds to the effort to understand the story of the Lochner Era
Court, both in terms of the Court's theory of political power and its
methods of legal reasoning.
,' Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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A. "Liberty of Contract" and Social Contract
The Supreme Court's Lochner Era decisions overturning legisla-
tive action on the grounds that it interfered with individual liberty
of contract fall into two categories. One group, as we have seen, in-
validated what the Court viewed as attempts to extend legislation
extraterritorially. The second group invalidated certain laws be-
cause of their substantive content, rather than the geographic
scope of their application-the far more controversial and well
known set of liberty of contract cases. 143 It may be that the Court's
use of the same doctrinal language to describe the two categories
was accidental, but there are reasons to suspect that the two sets of
cases reflect some common concerns that led the Court to speak of
them in the same way.
With only one exception, every one of the cases in the second
group overturned legislation that regulated the terms of employ-
ment contracts.1" The Court could have reached the same result by
characterizing them as deprivations of property without due proc-
ess of law, which would have been far more conventional.14 5 It is
not difficult to see how a statute imposing a minimum wage could
be characterized as a deprivation of an employer's property, and
statutes setting minimum prices for goods, rather than for labor,
141 Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Liberty 432, 458 (2005) ("The rights involved in the Lochner era were gener-
ally described as 'liberty of contract' rather than property interests, although prop-
ertx-like notions drove many of the arguments.")
Six of these decisions invalidated statutes regulating wages. See Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 604-18 (1936); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co.,
273 U.S. 657 (1927); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530, 530 (1925); Dorchy v. Kansas,
264 U.S. 286, 289 (1924); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262
U.S. 522, 544 (1923); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545*62 (1923). Two
invalidated statutes regulating the number of hours employees could work. See Chas.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552, 569 (1925); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-64 (1905). Two invalidated statutes that prohibited em-
ployers from refusing to hire members of labor unions. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1, 6-7, 14-26 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908). The ex-
ceptional case is Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 8 (1927), which invali-
dated a statute that required milk purchasers to pay the same price to farmers at dif-
ferent locations within the state.
141 Indeed, some decisions invalidated the employment regulations because they vio-
lated both liberty and property rights. E.g. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 544 (holding
that wage statute deprived an employer "of its property and liberty of contract with-
out due process of law").
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were never described as liberty of contract infringements. What
seems likely, particularly in light of the rhetoric of Free Labor that
developed in the context of the political struggle over slavery in the
middle of the nineteenth century, is that the appeal to liberty indi-
cated that the right protected was "special" to Lochner Era politi-
cal understandings."6
As a basis to overturn state law, however, liberty of contract
made its debut in the choice of law context. The soaring rhetoric of
liberty was certainly unnecessary to reach the result in the choice
of law cases, as these too could have been described merely as
property deprivations."7 Moreover, only two months before the
Court decided New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, it reached the
conclusion that insurance was a "business affected with a public in-
terest" and hence amenable to regulation as a public concern in a
way that ordinary "private" businesses were not."' Why then did
the territorial question resonate so strongly with the Court? Three
ideas at work in the choice of law cases help explain the Court's in-
vocation of liberty of contract-freedom of movement, notice, and
reciprocity-and those three unifying themes share a common con-
cern for individual consent to political power. The way in which
consent was understood helps to explain the outlook of the
Lochner Era Supreme Court more broadly, and in particular, the
notions of public power and private rights that animated its sub-
stantive due process cases.
Freedom of movement, the first of the three unifying themes in
the choice of law cases, was an important component of the idea of
legislative jurisdiction. Consider that the use of liberty to protect
economic rights was not uncontroversial in its own day. In 1926,
the scholar Charles Warren argued that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporated a common law conception of liberty, which
"meant simply 'liberty of the person,' or, in other words, 'the right
" See Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law,
in The State and Freedom of Contract 167 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998).
' In fact, in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, Justice Brandeis did just that, finding that
the defendants in the case had been deprived of property without due process of law
because the application of forum law "increases their obligation and imposes a bur-
den not contracted for." 281 U.S. 387, 409 (1930).
' See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406, 410-13 (1914).
2008] 1549
1550 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 94:1509
to have one's person free from physical restraint.""49 Liberty of
contract as a limitation on where a state could extend its powers
encompassed more than the right not to be incarcerated, but it still
related to the idea of physical movement. In declaring the limits of
state power, the Court was creating a right to escape the regulatory
power of the state.15 This concern was particularly significant given
that the primary use of the Due Process Clause as a limit on state
legislative jurisdiction was in the protection of foreign corporations
from being regulated by states in which they were not "doing busi-
ness," a test which essentially hinged on whether or not a corpora-
tion had an agent physically present within the state. Unlike natu-
ral persons, corporations were not entitled to protection under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. A corporation in-
corporated in one state did not enjoy the right to "travel" to other
states;... it could only enter another state if that state consented to
allow it to enter, which usually entailed payment of a franchise tax,
appointment of an agent upon whom process could be served, and
willingness to conform to various restrictions on its conduct. 2 Just
as states had the right to deny a corporation entry, liberty of con-
tract protected a corporation's right to not enter a given state.1 53 A
state's "jurisdiction" to regulate was confined to those who con-
sented to be brought within it and to be subject to its regulatorypower."
"' Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
Harv. L. Rev. 431, 440 (1926).
"' Thus in Head the Court spoke of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
against imposing a "perpetual contractual paralysis." N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234
U.S. 149, 161 (1914).
15 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868).
152 See supra Section I.A.
153 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, for example, the defendants challenged Louisiana's law
on the grounds that its "real purpose" was to force foreign corporations to appoint
agents so that the corporations would be subject to franchise taxes, but that "it is be-
yond the legitimate sphere of state government to compel a foreign corporation to
enter its borders for the transaction of business which can be done elsewhere." Brief
of Plaintiffs in Error at 18, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (No. 446). Jus-
tice Harlan's dissent in Hooper v. California, the principal source of Allgeyer's liberty
of contract language, argued that a state could not criminalize transacting with "a for-
eign corporation that chooses not to enter the former state by its own agents." 155
U.S. 648, 664 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"4 Hence the Court's rationalization that an out-of-state motorist temporarily pre-
sent in a particular state has consented to allow the state to appoint an agent for him
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The second dimension of the liberty of contract cases is a con-
cern with notice. If a legal standard can be applied to a particular
action that differs from the one in operation at the time and place
of the action, it becomes difficult for an actor to know how to con-
form his behavior to the law. The Lochner Era Court perceived a
significant constitutional problem with the retroactive application
of laws, even where more specific textual prohibitions like the Ex
Post Facto Clause and the Contracts Impairment Clause did not
apply.' 5 Tellingly, this concern extended to accrued rights to sue
for civil damages.'56 Justice Holmes analogized state legislation de-
priving a litigant of an accrued right to bring a lawsuit to a re-
quirement that "a man pay a baker for a gratuitous deposit of
rolls," and he upheld a due process challenge to the legislation.'
57
Justice Holmes was willing to accept Lochner's premise that some
redistributive legislative action-even legislation that applied to
bakeries-was itself illegal because it was in some important sense
confiscatory. It is also worth noting that the Court struck down on
due process grounds several state laws that it considered unconsti-
tutionally vague, implicating similar concerns about retrospective
lawmaking as well as the separation of powers.' The Court also
who can accept service of process on his behalf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356
(1927).
, See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (Brandeis, J.) (invali-
dating, under Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process, a congressional attempt to
annul insurance contracts that were "valid when made").
,56 See Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 156-58 (1913) (unanimously holding
that a "right to compensation was a vested property right" and retroactive repeal of
statutory cause of action violated Fourteenth Amendment).
"' Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338, 339-40 (1922).
'"See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 240-43 (1932); Cline
v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 453-65 (1927); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391-95 (1926); Am. Seeding Mach. Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660, 661-62
(1915); cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (constru-
ing a federal criminal statute narrowly because "fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed"). In the context of criminal law, doctrines constraining
judicial crime-creation are typically justified with reference to the separation of pow-
ers, notice to the individual, and a concern for arbitrary (we might say, non-neutral)
enforcement of the law. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1985).
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for the first time required states to provide "just compensation" in
cases where legislation disturbed preexisting property rights.9
The choice of law problem is consistent with the basic concern of
all of these cases. If retroactivity presents the problem of "conflict
of laws viewed in reference to time,"'" as one contemporary com-
mentator put it, then conflict of laws might be thought of as the
problem of retroactivity in reference to space. The unifying theme
is an aversion to shifting legal standards and the defeat of individ-
ual expectations. It has been suggested that aversion to retroactive
legislation and the protection of accrued rights was rooted in sepa-
ration of powers ideas, according to which legislatures acted pro-
spectively while courts acted retrospectively.6 ' This is an important
insight, but it does not go far enough. Choice of law doctrine ad-
dresses the separation of governments more than the separation of
government functions, yet the underlying concerns in these cases
were the same. Rather than simply principles relating to formal
structures, non-retroactvity and non-extraterritoriality expressed a
shared concern for notice-an essential ingredient to the individual
grant of consent to be governed. Without knowledge of the law
that is to govern one's activities, one can hardly choose to be ruled
by it. The idea that some degree of voluntariness was required be-
fore the law could apply brings these different lines of decisions to-
gether.
The third dimension of the Court's legislative jurisdiction cases
is reciprocity. Reciprocity was an explicit concern in a number of
different contexts. Consider that the Supreme Court on several oc-
casions struck down state taxes because they imposed taxes on
property whose owners received very little benefit from the taxes.62
That same rationale was used to explain why a state could not tax
property located outside the state. Where the property was located
.
59 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-41
(1897) (dictum); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
"6 Francis Wharton, Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism, 3 Int'l Rev. 50, 57
(1876).
161 See Wallace Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process, 10
Vand. L. Rev. 125, 133 (1956). See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested
Rights in the Early Republic, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1421 (1999).
162 See, e.g., Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller County Hwy. & Bridge Dist., 277 U.S.
160, 162-63 (1928); Road Improvement Dist. v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 274 U.S. 188, 192-94
(1927); Myles Salt Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478, 483-85 (1916).
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in another state, the owner derived no benefits from the state seek-
ing to tax it.163 A similar idea of reciprocity operated in the realm of
corporations law. A corporation outside a state could not be forced
to pay a franchise tax "for the privilege of doing business" in the
state if it was not in fact enjoying the privilege. Why did reciprocity
matter to the Court? Its larger significance can be better seen by
looking to one of the most famous pillars of "classical" American
law: the doctrine of consideration in contract law. The considera-
tion doctrine required that a promise be given in exchange for
some reciprocal benefit in order to be enforceable at law. This mu-
tuality, however formal, served as a manifestation of assent to be
bound." Reciprocity between the state and the individual-
indicated by territorial presence-operated similarly. When a state
attempted to regulate matters beyond its borders, it imposed a
non-reciprocal burden on the individual being regulated. The fact
that there was no reciprocity in the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the state indicated a defect of assent to be governed.
The common thread through these three principles-freedom of
movement, notice, and reciprocity-is an idea of political consent
and voluntariness. The choice of law doctrine could easily have
been framed in terms of the rights of states against states, as the
language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Justice Story's comity
theory, and the modern interest analysis methodology all tend to
do. The Court, however, consistently cast the issue in terms of in-
dividual rights against the government and based its doctrine pri-
marily on the Due Process Clause." The Court was less concerned
about interstate harmony than about protecting individuals from
government power imposed against their will.
,63See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202 (1905).
"See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 769, 832 (1985).
,65 Indeed, the idea that due process of law precluded the extraterritorial application
of law was not confined to legal conflicts between two states. See Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (deciding conflict between law of Texas and Mexico); Com-
pania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87
(1927) (deciding conflict between the Philippine protectorate and France); see also W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914) (citing the Supremacy Clause
rather than due process to resolve a conflict between South Carolina and the U.S.
federal government).
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This idea helps tie together competing scholarly interpretations
of the Lochner Era. Revisionist accounts of Lochner have stressed
what Professor Howard Gilman has called "the principle of neu-
trality," according to which the Supreme Court condemned legisla-
tion that bestowed government favors on certain groups at the ex-
pense of others as arbitrary and "partial."1" This concern for
neutrality is thought to have arisen out of Jacksonian hostility to-
ward special privileges, as well as Madisonian ideals of republican
government, free from the control of particular factions.67 Gil-
man's interpretation rejects the view advanced by New Deal parti-
sans that the Lochner Court can be explained in terms of a bias in
favor of wealthy interests and a desire to enshrine laissez-faire eco-
nomics as constitutional dogma. Rather, the Court's concern was
with those who had managed to gain control of the legislative
process to use public powers for their own private ends.
Other scholars, however, have sought to qualify the neutrality
thesis. In their account, preexisting notions of private rights shaped
the meaning of neutrality, giving certain rights, particularly those
relating to employment, a core substantive meaning." The concern
about restrictions on employment can be traced to Northern "Free
Labor ideology," which made the right to sell one's own labor a
centerpiece of the eventually triumphant outlook of the Republi-
can Party in the middle and late nineteenth century. According to
these scholars, the Lochner Court did indeed seek to protect cer-
tain fundamental rights, keeping them safely behind the protective
shield of the Due Process Clause.
An unexpected synthesis between the Marshall Era concern with
vested rights and the countervailing Jacksonian repudiation of spe-
cial privileges may help explain the role of fundamental rights
ideas in shaping the Due Process Clause. The Court was willing to
declare legislation "arbitrary" not only because its essential pur-
pose was to redistribute wealth, but also because it operated retro-
spectively or extraterritorially. What made all of these illegitimate
was the use of government power for ends beyond those for which
'66See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 10 (1993).
167 Id. at 114.
'68See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 90 (1998); McCurdy, supra
note 146, at 167.
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it had been granted. Government action that shifted economic
power, like legislation in these other forms of jurisdictionally defi-
cient government action, was inherently coercive. 69 It was incon-
ceivable that a government constituted in the first instance by the
unanimous consent of the governed would have been given author-
ity to take property from its members against their will.y
This view has been anticipated in some respects by Professor
Owen Fiss, who argues that "[t]he theory of the social contract
prevalent in the nineteenth century defined the bargaining rela-
tionship among the founders in such a way as to deny government
the power to redistribute wealth."''7' The exercise of government
powers for the general good was presumed to be voluntary, on the
premise that individuals willingly surrender some degree of their
natural sovereignty in order to establish civil society and protect
their own interests.12 Senseless or selfish exercises of power, how-
ever, were not viewed as part of that grant of power. Thus Calder
v. Bull's statement in 1798-that "a law that takes property from A.
and gives it to B" violated "the great first principles of the social
compact" 73-found renewed expression in the writing of Justice
Holmes in 1922, who declared that "the Constitution and the first
principles of legal thinking allow the law of the place where a con-
169 It is perhaps in light of this view that Justice Holmes viewed only those govern-
ment regulations that secured "an average reciprocity of advantage" for those being
regulated as exempt from the Fifth Amendment's "just compensation" requirement
when the regulations affected rights of property ownership. See Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
170 See James Madison, Sovereignty (1835), reprinted in 9 Writings of James Madi-
son 568, 570-71 (G. Hunt ed., 1910) (arguing that the establishment of civil society
"must result from the free consent of every individual").
171 8 Owen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled
Beginnings of the Modem State, 1888-1910, at 82 (1993). For a forceful rebuttal to
this interpretation, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court,
104 Yale L. J. 2309, 2312-14 (1995).
172 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (stating that formation of the social
compact "does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are
purely and exclusively private; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requir-
ing each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessar-
ily to injure another") (citation omitted); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369-70 (1886).
" 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis altered); see also Wilkinson v. Leland,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829) (Story, J.) ("We know of no case, in which a legislative
act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a con-
stitutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the union.") (emphasis added).
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tract is made to determine the validity and the consequences of the
act.' 74 The Court was not of one mind on all the issues it faced, and
Justice Holmes certainly disagreed with its conclusion in Lochner.
Nonetheless, Justice Holmes and his colleagues consistently agreed
that a state lacked the power to reshape private ordering where the
parties involved had not at least impliedly consented to come
within its jurisdiction.
The importance of voluntariness in delineating the lawful powers
of states helps explain the particular concern for the protection of
rights related to employment. Free Labor ideology is thought to
have connected government interference in bargains between em-
ployers and employees with Southern chattel slavery, the ultimate
form of state control of the labor market and a rival model to
Northern industrialism. But there is more to Free Labor even than
this, as can be seen by comparing it with classical protection of
property rights. Redistribution of property was by definition non-
neutral, and hence coercive, "confiscatory," and unjustified-but
redistribution of the rights to control how one used one's person
was even worse, for it struck at the heart of the idea of voluntary
political arrangements. Free Labor ideology was more than a the-
ory of economic self-determinism. It implicated the most basic
rights of citizenship and democratic participation. No less a theorist
of the relationship between labor, property, and social compact
than John Locke argued that men lack the power to consent to en-
slave themselves.'75 The idea that all men are endowed with an inal-
ienable right in their own persons was central to the liberal order
because it was this right that permitted civil society to be formed in
the first place.76 No law proceeding from the sovereign power
originally vested in the people who established the American gov-
74 Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922) (emphasis added); see also
The Federalist No. 44, at 250 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[L]aws
impairing the obligation of contracts are contrary to the first principles of the social
compact and to every principle of sound legislation.") (emphasis added). Admittedly,
the decision in Liebing upheld a state's application of its own state law to a contract.
"John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 284 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
176 Consider Abraham Lincoln's declaration: "[N]o man is good enough to govern
another man, without that other's consent. I say this is the leading principle-the
sheet anchor of American republicanism." Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Ill.
(Oct. 16, 1854), reprinted in 2 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 266 (Roy P. Ba-
sler ed., 1953).
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ernment could operate to divest the people of the original right
that the American government had been established to secure. The
prepolitical character of the right to enter into voluntary arrange-
ments was essential to any outlook that imagined a prepolitical
moment.
In this regard, the argument articulated by commentators like
Professor Cass Sunstein that the Lochner Court's error was in its
assumption that "[m]arket ordering under the common law was
understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct"'"
misstates somewhat the nature of the political theory suggested by
these cases. The core principle of the social contract view was that
nature did not give any person the right to rule any other. There
was no divine right of any one man to be king. Each was by nature
sovereign. Thus, in a choice of law case involving slavery, Lord
Mansfield opined that slavery could only exist by "positive law":
when a slave was brought into the territory of a government that
did not acknowledge slavery, the slave reverted to the natural hu-
man state of non-slavery. 817 If there was no natural right to rule an-
other person, the only political arrangement that was in accord
with nature was one that derived from the consent of every mem-
ber of the polity. The Lochner Court made it clear that there was
no vested right in the common law rules for acquiring property-
the common law was not itself part of nature and could be altered
prospectively. 917 The common law was not the "baseline" of valid
wealth distribution, except insofar as the actions taken in reliance
upon existing legal rules were entitled, within limits defined by
pressing public need, to their promised legal effect." Disparities in
7 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 874 (1987).
178 Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772); see also Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842) (Story, J.) (holding that, but for the inclusion
of the Fugitive Slave Clause in the Constitution, any slave who escaped to a free state
would have been made free, regardless of his masters' claimed property rights).
1 See, e.g., Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912); see also David E.
Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2003); Woolhandler, su-
pra note 47, at 1024.
" Doctrinally, nonretroactivity and nonextraterritoriality were both qualified by the
government's inherent police power. Understood as the general means of protecting
health, safety, and welfare, however, the police power simply reflected the goals that
motivated individuals to form civil society in the first place. Thus, to say that the
Court permitted modification of common law rules only when justified by police
power interests does not reflect a bias in favor of the common law. Cf. Cass R. Sun-
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wealth undeniably altered the practical ability of individuals to ob-
tain certain goods by voluntary agreement, but that disparity was
not what was prepolitical. What was prepolitical was the right to
grant or withhold consent to political power.
The Lochner Court's willingness to give heightened protection
to certain fundamental rights can be reconciled with the principle
of neutrality by recognizing the importance of voluntariness in the
establishment of civil society and the formation of the American
Constitution. The use of due process to police state choice of law is
highly revealing, for it shows that the ultimate meaning of due
process was neither substantive nor procedural but constitutive. It
protected individuals from the application of government authority
that they never consented to be subjected to in the first place.
B. The Reality of Realism
Conventional accounts of the decline and fall of the Lochner Era
have stressed the importance of external political forces upon the
Supreme Court's actions. The Lochner Era, it is argued, should be
understood as a sustained effort on the part of the individual Jus-
tices of the Court to force their political opinions on the nation
through the exercise of judicial review. According to these "exter-
nalist" accounts, the Court only changed course after its laissez-
faire economic views brought national scorn following the onset of
the Great Depression and precipitated a showdown with President
Franklin Roosevelt, in the form of his "Court-packing" plan.'8' Al-
though revisionist accounts challenging this interpretation have
emerged, the narrative is still a mainstay in many accounts of the
New Deal and the history of the Supreme Court."
stein, Reply-Lochnering, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 65, 69-70 (2003) (arguing that the Court in
the Lochner Era had a "limited" view of the police power when it came to legislatures
departing from the common law). Rather, it reflects the view that any change in pri-
vate ordering had to accord with the powers granted by naturally autonomous indi-
viduals, which were not thought to include the power to redistribute for redistribu-
tion's own sake.
,8 For a thorough and critical discussion of this account, see Barry Cushman, Re-
thinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994). See also G. Edward White,
Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist Debate, 110
Am. Hist. Rev. 1094 (2005).
" See Cushman, supra note 181, at 203 n.3.
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As we have seen, the Supreme Court's choice of law decisions
shared certain connections with its substantive due process deci-
sions, in doctrinal rhetoric and in an underlying political and con-
stitutional theory. It is less surprising, but equally important, to
note that they shared a methodological approach-an understand-
ing of what law is and what the judges who administer it do. The
Court's choice of law doctrine, jettisoned at the same time its sub-
stantive due process doctrine came apart, lost favor largely because
it reflected a metaphysical understanding of the law that had been
replaced by a radically different outlook. Given the fundamental
nature of this shift, as well as the conceptual overlap between the
vested rights theory and substantive due process doctrines, it is
unlikely that the philosophical change was an unimportant part of
the abandonment of Lochner's notions of substantive due process.
The Lochner Court's use of due process to protect "liberty" and
"property" from legislative interference relied on notions of dis-
tinct public and private spheres. Only businesses that were "af-
fected with a public interest"-typically monopolies like rail-
roads-could be subjected to price regulations, for example. '83
Where there was no public interest, a business was private, and its
property rights could not be infringed by government action with-
out offending the Due Process Clause. And as we have seen in the
context of liberty of contract, there was generally no legitimate
public interest in how a person might choose to employ his labor.
The public-private distinction that was central to Lochner Era
constitutional law provided the mechanism animating the vested
rights choice of law theory." Where substantive due process relied
on marking a single boundary between public power and private
rights, however, choice of law introduced another variable, estab-
lishing a three-way public-public-private distinction. The Court's
choice of law doctrine cleaved the public power of a state into two
different spheres of authority. The first public sphere referred to
the power of a state to create legal obligations, including both obli-
183 See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L.
Rev. 881, 961-962 (2005).
" In fact, the public-private distinction partly developed out of issues related to the
conflict of laws, since it was the development of sovereignty theories that made the
conception of a distinct public sphere possible. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, 1423 (1982).
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gations owed to itself, such as criminal laws, and obligations owed
to other people. The second public sphere referred to the power of
a state to establish rules for enforcing private rights. These public
powers included the remedies and procedure law and, not surpris-
ingly, the public policy exception to the obligation to enforce for-
eign causes of action. The two public spheres (assuming a cause of
action was being brought in a state other than the one creating it)
were separated from one another by territory. The place where
particular events took place determined the nature of the rights
flowing from those events. The place where the bearer of those
rights was asserting them determined the appropriate procedure
and remedies.
What made this separation possible was the distinction between
substance and procedure, which grew out of the distinction be-
tween the public and private spheres of human activity. The vested
rights system functioned by harnessing the traditional idea of pri-
vate rights, theorizing that a plaintiff with an accrued cause of ac-
tion had acquired a kind of property interest that had an existence
of its own and could be transported from place to place."' Only by
creating this independent benchmark against which to measure the
asserted powers of states to regulate the way in which laws were
enforced could a line be drawn between the competing powers of
the states.
The strict separation between substance and procedure, right
and remedy, private and public, was necessary in order to maintain
a conceptually clear understanding of what law is. As Beale put it,
"[i]f two laws were present at the same time and in the same place
upon the same subject we should also have a condition of anar-
chy." 86 There could be no rule of law if a multiplicity of contradic-
tory laws could be invoked at any particular time. For classical le-
gal thinkers, conflicts of law were the clearest threat to their view
of the law as a seamless web, perfectible and neutral, governed by
rules that could be worked out without reference to the policy con-
cerns appropriate to legislative bodies. " It was resolved by estab-
1
" Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) ("The plaintiff
owns something, and we help him get it.").
"Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 4.12 (1935).
,' See Horwitz, supra note 184, at 1425-26.
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lishing firm rules that drew upon the established principles separat-
ing the public interest from the ordering of private life.
Almost as soon as the vested rights choice of law theory began
to establish a constitutional footing, it became a prime target of the
emerging Legal Realist movement." The Realists condemned
Beale's system on a number of grounds, rejecting it not only as
constitutional but also as common law doctrine. First, as an empiri-
cal matter, the Realists maintained that the theory simply did not
describe the process by which courts decided conflicts of law. In
their view, the vested rights doctrine was little more than a vocabu-
lary of post hoc justifications judges employed after deciding cases
before them on the basis of other considerations. 9 Second, as a
normative matter, the theory provided unsatisfying results. Be-
cause it was "mechanical," abstract, and conceptualistic-precisely
the neutral, legal features that made it attractive to classical think-
ers-it failed to do justice in individual cases." Moreover, the
wooliness of its concepts made results unpredictable, both because
its rules were incoherent and manipulable, 9 ' and because the pub-
lic policy exception made their elaborate formality ultimately
pointless, since the forum still had the last word on a plaintiff's
right to sue."
But so what? No one ever claimed the law was perfect. These
objections could have been raised with equal force against any
number of other nineteenth-century legal doctrines. For some rea-
son, however, conflict of laws became a special target of American
Legal Realism. Part of the explanation may be that choice of law
theory was an attractive target because it had no ready constitu-
ency of support93 It is not as if the American Liberty League-the
Wall Street-backed advocacy group that argued against the consti-
' See, e.g., Michael S. Green, Note, Legal Realism, Lex Fori, and the Choice-of-
Law Revolution, 104 Yale L.J. 967, 967 (1995) (noting that the "choice-of-law revolu-
tion" is "widely recognized to have been a product of legal realism").
89 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
Yale L.J. 736, 745-46 (1924).
" See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev.
173,193 (1933).
"' See generally W.W. Cook, 'Immovables' and the 'Law' of the 'Situs': A Study in
the Ambiguity of Legal Terminology, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1246, 1247-48 (1939).
' Lorenzen, supra note 189, at 746.
1931 am grateful to Professor Michael Collins for suggesting this idea.
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tutionality of New Deal legislation-was concerned with these
kinds of jurisdictional issues."' Of course, it is not entirely true that
no particular political group had a stake in the maintenance of the
classical approach to choice of law: at a time when courts were re-
luctant to enforce contractual choice of law provisions, the ability
of parties (read: insurance companies) to structure their activities
by taking advantage of the law's formalities undoubtedly func-
tioned as an alternative route to the same result. And at a more ba-
sic level, territorialism restricted the scope of regulatory power, a
feature that surely made it appealing to commercial interests.
Nonetheless, there is undoubtedly agreat deal of truth in the no-
tion that Beale's doctrine was low-hanging fruit, within the Real-
ists' easy reach. At the very least, the fact that choice of law was
not a salient political issue likely made the Realists' efforts easier.
At the root of the Realists' critique of the vested rights ap-
proach, however, was a more fundamental source of disagreement
that helps explain their determination to see it abandoned. The
Legal Realists simply did not believe in the existence of "neutral"
principles of law and objected to a legal system predicated upon
what they saw as fairy tales masquerading as reality.9 To Walter
Wheeler Cook, the most dogged of Beale's adversaries, those
searching for determinate rules to guide choice of law were like
babies "cry[ing] for the moon."'96 The distinction between rights
and remedies was imaginary.'97 A right without a remedy was no
right at all. Once this distinction was obliterated, the difference be-
tween public and private rights, substance and procedure, central
194 See generally Charles R. Geisst, Wall Street: A History 238-40 (1997); George
Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History of the American Liberty
League, 1934-1940 (1962); Frederick Rudolph, The American Liberty League, 1934-
1940, 56 Am. Hist. Rev. 19 (1950).
195 See Roosevelt, supra note 94, at 2459 (noting that Cook's "central attack was
aimed at the jurisprudential groundwork of Beale's theory, his understanding of the
nature of law and rights").
196 Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws, 37 U. I11. L. Rev. 418 (1943), in Selected Readings on Conflict
of Laws 97, 99 (Maurice S. Culp ed., 1956).
'9 For this reason, Cook argued that the separation of law and equity artificially
suggested that only the common law defined property rights. The availability of equi-
table remedies, in Cook's view, was as central to the nature of ownership as the com-
mon law's rules. See Walter W. Cook, The Place of Equity in Our Legal System, 3
Am. L. Sch. Rev. 173 (1912).
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to the vested rights system collapsed. Thus, Cook articulated the
view that a so-called vested right was simply the public policy of
the forum state, a right created by its law that happened to mimic
the law of another state.198 If the judgment a plaintiff might receive
differed depending on what state the plaintiff sued in, then the
plaintiff's right of recovery was equally varied. All law was politics
and policy, and the separation of functions that gave the judiciary
its meaning was built on a fiction. The conceptually elegant if prac-
tically unworkable regime that was devised in order to deny the
possibility that laws could ever overlap, and hence that there al-
ways existed a single governing rule of law, was replaced by a sys-
tem in which there were multiple possible "right answers" to
choice of law questions.
Jurisprudential impulses drove Beale to formulate the vested
rights theory, and jurisprudential impulses drove Realists like
Cook to tear it apart. Legal Realists and the Progressives who
adopted their ideas may have had political aims,' but their dis-
agreement with the formalism of the classical approach to the con-
flicts of laws was not in every sense instrumental. Theirs was a
complaint about what they perceived as the artificial nature of ju-
dicial decisionmaking flowing from the premise that there was al-
ways one law, and only one law, governing any particular person,
thing, or event at any given moment. Their success in persuading
the bench, and the Supreme Court in particular, to reject the classi-
cal understanding of the law almost certainly was not the result of
external political pressure. It proceeded on its own as the result of
a collective loss of faith, the effect of which was magnified by
changes in Court personnel.
This highlights an important irony of the Realists' critique of
classical law. Their complaint against nineteenth-century formalism
was that it was abstract and conceptualistic, premised on a belief in
a transcendent structure of rules that simply was not real. Yet the
point of their contention was itself philosophical and abstract, and
their success grew out of the fact that the conflicts rules they con-
' Cook, supra note 133, at 475 ("[A] court never enforces foreign rights but only
rights created by its own law.").
See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurispru-
dence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999,
1025-26 (1972).
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demned did not attract a political constituency. As a result, the na-
ture of their complaint obscures their own role in changing the way
the law was understood. "One thing is clear," argued Karl Lle-
wellyn, perhaps the most influential of the Realists. "There is no
school of realists. There is no likelihood that there will be such a
school."2" Regardless of whether Llewellyn's claim is accurate, the
claim is itself revealing of the way legal thinkers like Llewellyn
thought about the changes that they were bringing about in the
American legal landscape. The Realists denied the difference be-
tween substance and procedure-all judicial decisionmaking was
politics. How else, then, could Realism explain Lochner's rise and
fall except as the result of political shifts? The reality is that Real-
ism itself was an important player, but Realists were unlikely to say
so (to make the statement in this way, after all, relies upon the kind
of reification they deplored). The role of differences in legal phi-
losophy is obscured by a philosophy that disputed the existence of
a distinctly legal realm.
Within a year of the publication of Beale's First Restatement,
the vested rights theory was a dead letter as a matter of constitu-
tional law, and the fingerprints of Realists like Cook were all over
it. At the same time, its demise was connected with the unraveling
of substantive due process protection of economic rights. The pub-
lic-private distinction had been dealt a body blow in 1934 in the
Supreme Court's decision in Nebbia v. New York."°' Nebbia re-
jected the proposition that only certain businesses were "affected
with the public interest" and could be subject to price regulations
without offending the Due Process Clause. Yet that decision in
some sense merely repeated the sophistic maneuver that had
brought about the creation of the "affected with the public inter-
est" doctrine in the first place:2' defining government intrusion in
the seemingly private sphere as a necessary means to protect the
public good and hence outside the original property right. 3 The
2 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1233 (1931).
201 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
202 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-26 (1876).
203 Hence Justice Roberts's statement that "'affected with a public interest' is the
equivalent of 'subject to the exercise of the police power."' Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 533.
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basic proposition that a private right remained whenever the police
power could not validly be invoked survived.
The next year, the Court turned to the conflict of laws, where the
repudiation of private right was more complete. In Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, ° the Court permitted
California to apply its workers' compensation statute to persons in-
jured in Alaska but employed in California. Rather than discuss
the issue in terms of fixed rights of the parties, determined by terri-
torial principles, the Court adopted an analysis based on the bal-
ancing of the interest of the states involved. Relations between in-
dividuals were to be determined with reference to entirely public
concerns. Even more profoundly, the Court denied the existence
for constitutional purposes of a fixed obligation between two citi-
zens. It was entirely possible that private rights with respect to the
same issue could differ as a matter of law depending on what court
happened to determine them. And if there were no hard and fast
private rights, there was no meaningful distinction between eco-
nomic activities that a legislature could and could not reach by
regulation.
This was the modernist, Realist view of law. While the intricacies
of the Court's better known Due Process Clause and Commerce
Clause decisions lie outside the scope of this Note, the interest
shown by Legal Realists in choice of law doctrine and their success
in toppling its classical premises suggests that at least part of the
New Deal Era constitutional shift took place in a more esoteric,
law-centered arena. To accept without qualification a Realist ac-
count of the Supreme Court's increasing tolerance of economic
regulation is to overlook the effect of Legal Realism itself as a
movement in the law. The Supreme Court may have followed "th'
204 294 U.S. 532, 547-50 (1935). The decision was written by Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone, later the author of International Shoe and Carolene Products. For an account of
the close relationship between Stone, former dean of the Columbia Law School, and
Walter Wheeler Cook, the highest paid member of its faculty, see George Rutherglen,
International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347, 354-56
(2002). Justice Stone's long-standing skepticism of vested rights theories of choice of
law was evident in his refusal to join Justice Brandeis's opinions for the majority in
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933), and Bradford Electric Light Co.
v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932).
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iliction returns, ' ' but it didn't have all that much to follow when
the names Idealism and Materialism did not appear on the ballot.
CONCLUSION
In its attempt to perfect the application of American law by cre-
ating a unified, determinate system for resolving interstate choice
of law questions, the Supreme Court fell short of its goal. The
Court's fairly blind reliance on common law choice of law rules was
ill-suited for a time of increasing heterogeneity in the legal forms
created by states. How far short of its goal the Court fell, however,
is an open question. This Note has provided an account of how the
Court's theories worked and a framework by which to judge them
in light of the standard criticisms of Lochner Era constitutional
law. It has also shown how the basic commitment to rule of law
grounded in individual consent helps unite competing ideas of the
Lochner Court's constitutional understanding, and how its doctrine
was overcome, not by political pressure as such, but by changes in
legal metaphysics that encouraged a more political outlook by the
Court. Normative judgments about the Court's choice of law and
due process doctrines should begin with the question of whether
our constitutional culture today ought to share those same underly-
ing commitments.
'Finley P. Dunne, Mr. Dooley on the Choice of Law 52 (Edward J. Bander ed.,
1963).
